Mesa Power Group, LLC v. Government of Canada
255 F. Supp. 3d 175
| D.D.C. | 2017Background
- Mesa Power (U.S. investor) brought a NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitration challenging Ontario’s Feed‑in‑Tariff (FIT) program and a separate Green Energy Investment Agreement (GEIA) that reserved grid capacity for a Korean consortium, alleging violations of NAFTA Articles 1102, 1103, 1105, and 1106.
- A three‑member UNCITRAL tribunal (seat in Miami) held extensive hearings, issued a final award finding FIT/GEIA constituted government “procurement” under NAFTA Article 1108 (so Articles 1102/1103/1106 did not apply), rejected Mesa’s Article 1105 fair‑and‑equitable‑treatment claim, and awarded costs to Canada.
- One arbitrator (Judge Brower) dissented in part, arguing the FIT program is not procurement and that Canada violated Article 1105 by favoring the Korean consortium.
- Mesa petitioned in D.C. federal court to vacate the award under FAA § 10 (arguing arbitrators exceeded their powers, engaged in misconduct, and acted in manifest disregard of the law); Canada filed to confirm the award under the New York Convention and sought attorney’s fees for frivolous litigation.
- The district court applied the FAA/Convention review framework, assumed (without deciding) D.C. Circuit law governed, and conducted the narrow judicial review applicable to arbitral awards.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Mesa) | Defendant's Argument (Canada) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the tribunal exceeded its powers by treating FIT/GEIA as "procurement" under NAFTA Art. 1108 | The tribunal misread/ignored NAFTA text (esp. Art.1001(5)(a) definition of procurement) and thus abandoned the treaty language | Tribunal reasonably and exhaustively interpreted text, context, precedent; its interpretation was an arguable construction and within authority | Court: tribunal’s procurement interpretation was a text‑based, reasoned construction; not beyond authority — no vacatur. |
| Whether the tribunal unlawfully deferred to Ontario (denying Mesa a fair hearing / changing standard) | Tribunal granted excessive deference to government policy, effectively lowering Mesa’s burden and prejudicing equal treatment rules | Tribunal made de novo factual findings, carefully analyzed Article 1105, and merely recognized that states have policy space; no change in burden or denial of fair hearing | Court: alleged "deference" was lawful contextual interpretation; no §10(a)(3) misconduct or §10(a)(4) excess of power; no vacatur. |
| Whether the award is vacatable for "manifest disregard of the law" | Tribunal ignored well‑defined legal principles on procurement and fair‑and‑equitable treatment | There is conflicting authority; tribunal stated and applied governing principles; no clear, explicit law ignored | Court: assuming manifest‑disregard survives, Mesa failed to show arbitrators knew and willfully ignored a clearly applicable legal rule. |
| Whether Canada is entitled to attorney’s fees for frivolous/bad‑faith litigation | N/A (Canada sought fees) | Mesa’s vacatur petition was meritless and fees are warranted | Court: Mesa’s arguments, though unsuccessful, were nonfrivolous and within bargained‑for review; fees denied. |
Key Cases Cited
- Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564 (2013) (arbitral awards can be vacated only in very unusual circumstances; review is narrow)
- Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008) (FAA §§10 and 11 provide exclusive expedited vacatur/modification grounds)
- E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 531 U.S. 57 (2000) (arbitrator’s arguably-construing‑the‑contract standard limits judicial review)
- TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (distinguishing review regimes for awards set aside where made vs. where enforcement is sought)
- LaPrade v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 246 F.3d 702 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (discussing manifest‑disregard doctrine in D.C. Circuit)
- First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995) (arbitration review is limited; courts defer to arbitrators’ factual and legal constructions)
