142 F. Supp. 3d 663
N.D. Ill.2015Background
- Plaintiff Thomas Mervyn brings putative class claims under 49 C.F.R. § 376.12 (Truth-in-Leasing) and for unjust enrichment against Newesco and Atlas; earlier motions to dismiss were largely denied except as to certain equitable remedies.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment; the court granted Mervyn limited additional discovery under Rule 56(d), defendants renewed their motion, and the court denied the renewed motion.
- The denial addressed several merits issues (scope of § 376.12, unjust enrichment vs. written agreement) and, on the factual breach-of-lease question, denied summary judgment because defendants’ briefs cited the record directly rather than citing the parties’ Local Rule 56.1 statements and responses (a Local Rule violation).
- Defendants moved for reconsideration, arguing Local Rule 56.1 does not require citation to the 56.1 statements themselves and that district precedent does not uniformly impose that practice.
- The court rejected defendants’ interpretation, surveying fifteen years of district decisions holding that memoranda must cite the Local Rule 56.1 statements (not raw record exhibits) and explaining the rule’s purpose — to provide a central, efficient bridge between record and arguments.
- The court denied reconsideration but granted leave for defendants to file a revised, compliant summary judgment motion strictly limited to whether they breached the lease, to be filed by November 21, 2015.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Local Rule 56.1 require briefs to cite the parties' 56.1 statements rather than the record directly? | Parties should be required to cite 56.1 statements to streamline the court's review and show which facts are disputed. | Local Rule 56.1 does not expressly mandate citation to the 56.1 statements; citing record exhibits directly should be permissible. | The court holds the district's consistent practice requires citation to 56.1 statements, and briefs citing raw record material violate the rule. |
| Is the court's interpretation of Local Rule 56.1 novel or idiosyncratic? | The court's approach is consistent with long-standing district precedent and is not novel. | Defendants contend the court's interpretation is idiosyncratic. | The court rejects defendants' contention, citing decades of decisions (including seminal Malec) showing the rule's consistent interpretation. |
| Does Sojka v. Bovis undermine the district's Local Rule practice? | The district's rule remains valid despite Sojka; Sojka involved different facts and did not involve a brief that cited the record in lieu of 56.1 statements. | Defendants rely on Sojka (7th Cir.) to argue a litigant need not duplicate facts in both the statement and memorandum. | The court finds Sojka does not undermine the district rule because the Sojka plaintiff's brief actually cited the 56.1 statements; the Seventh Circuit did not condone the citation practice at issue here. |
| Remedy for defendants' Local Rule violation and next steps on breach question | N/A (procedural) | Defendants sought reconsideration or, alternatively, leave to file a revised, compliant summary judgment motion limited to breach. | The court denies reconsideration but grants leave to file a revised summary judgment motion limited to whether defendants breached the lease, by Nov. 21, 2015. |
Key Cases Cited
- Malec v. Sanford, 191 F.R.D. 581 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (seminal exposition of Local Rule 56.1 citation practice)
- Sojka v. Bovis Lend Lease, Inc., 686 F.3d 394 (7th Cir. 2012) (held a litigant need not duplicate facts in both a 56.1 statement and brief; distinguished here)
- Flint v. City of Belvidere, 791 F.3d 764 (7th Cir. 2015) (Seventh Circuit endorses district judges’ discretion to require strict compliance with Local Rule 56.1)
- Twohy v. First Nat’l Bank of Chicago, 758 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting routine compliance with procedural requirements even when not spelled out in the rule)