Merryfield v. Sullivan, 343 P.3d 515

Dustin Merryfield and Richard Quillen, civilly committed as sexually violent predators at Larned State Hospital, filed K.S.A. 60-1501 habeas petitions challenging a new administrative grievance procedure and sought relief without an evidentiary hearing.
The district court summarily denied the petitions, finding lack of standing, no protected due process right, and that defendants' conduct was not shocking; it then assessed $178 filing costs against each petitioner.
The district court denied reconsideration of the cost assessment, reasoning that K.S.A. 60-1505(d) permits imposition of costs on plaintiffs in habeas matters.
The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of the petitions but held K.S.A. 59-29a23—which specifically addresses costs for sexually violent predator habeas proceedings—required taxing costs to the county, not petitioners.
The Kansas Supreme Court granted review solely on whether district courts have discretion to assess costs against these petitioners or whether K.S.A. 59-29a23 mandates that costs be taxed to the county where the person was determined to be a sexually violent predator.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Who bears filing and related costs for habeas petitions filed by civilly committed sexually violent predators?	Merryfield/Quillen: district court may assess costs to petitioners under general habeas cost statute (K.S.A. 60-1505(d)).	Secretary: district courts have discretion under general statutes; alternatively legislative intent supports county bearing costs only for meritorious petitions.	Court: K.S.A. 59-29a23 is the more specific statute and requires costs be taxed to the county responsible for the costs.
May the Secretary rely on legislative history to override the plain text of the specific statute?	Merryfield/Quillen: plain statutory text controls; legislative history is not needed.	Secretary: legislative history shows costs intended to be borne by counties (and concerns about county burden inform scope).	Court: legislative history was ambiguous and cannot overcome clear statutory language; courts rely on plain language.

State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 911, 329 P.3d 400 (Kan. 2014) (when a general statute and specific statute conflict, the specific controls)
Vontress v. State, 299 Kan. 607, 325 P.3d 1114 (Kan. 2014) (specific legislation controls a particular phase over a general statute)
State v. Looney, 299 Kan. 903, 327 P.3d 425 (Kan. 2014) (legislative intent governs statutory interpretation; courts look first to plain language)
Stanley v. Sullivan, 300 Kan. 1015, 336 P.3d 870 (Kan. 2014) (statutory interpretation is reviewable as a matter of law)
State v. Helms, 242 Kan. 511, 748 P.2d 425 (Kan. 1988) (quoting that the specific-statute rule is a rule of interpretation to effect legislative intent)