425 F.Supp.3d 1201
D. Ariz.2019Background
- In August 2015 four I-10 freeway shootings occurred in Phoenix; DPS recovered bullets from the scenes and the crime lab linked them to a Hi-Point C9 9mm handgun.
- Leslie Merritt pawned a Hi-Point C9 on August 30, 2015 at ~5:31 p.m.; the BMW victim (Hackbarth) experienced a rapid front-left tire deflation on the evening of August 30 (approx. 9:30–10:00 p.m.); a bullet was later recovered from that tire.
- On September 18, 2015 DPS criminalists identified Merritt’s pawned gun as the source of the bullets and Merritt was arrested without a warrant that evening; a grand jury indicted him on September 24, 2015.
- Independent examiners later (pretrial) concluded the ballistics comparisons were inconclusive; Merritt was released and charges were dismissed in April 2016.
- Merritt sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Arizona law (false arrest/imprisonment, malicious prosecution, Brady, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, aiding-and-abetting); defendants moved for summary judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Merritt's Argument | State/DPS Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Probable cause for the warrantless arrest (at time of arrest, Sept 18) | Arrest was unreasonable because the pawn timestamp (5:31 p.m.) conflicted with BMW tire deflation ~9:30–10:00 p.m.; officers should have resolved timing before arrest | Crime lab identification of Merritt’s gun and other investigative facts gave probable cause | Genuine factual dispute about whether officers resolved the timing discrepancy; summary judgment denied on state-law false arrest/imprisonment claims for pre-indictment period (arrest→indictment) |
| Effect of grand jury indictment on malicious-prosecution claims | Indictment was procured by fraud, fabricated ballistics, and withheld exculpatory evidence; therefore presumption of probable cause is rebutted | Indictment creates a presumption/prima facie evidence of probable cause; plaintiff must show indictment induced by fraud, perjury, fabricated evidence, or bad faith | Indictment creates a presumption of probable cause under Arizona law; Merritt failed to produce sufficient evidence of fabrication, perjury, or bad faith to rebut it → summary judgment granted on malicious prosecution claims |
| Qualified immunity under § 1983 | Officers not entitled to immunity because arrest lacked probable cause and evidence was fabricated/withheld | Officers entitled to qualified immunity because law was not clearly established in the precise circumstances and no controlling precedent placed conduct beyond debate | Qualified immunity applies to § 1983 false arrest/imprisonment and to indictment-based claims; summary judgment granted on federal claims on qualified immunity grounds |
| Brady (failure to disclose exculpatory evidence) | Non-disclosure of LPR data, pole-camera info, second Hackbarth interview, and other materials prejudiced Merritt’s liberty pretrial | Either evidence was not clearly exculpatory or not suppressed in bad-faith; Brady requires prejudice to trial outcome | Court found alleged withheld material not clearly exculpatory or not prejudicial here; Brady claim dismissed on summary judgment |
| State tort claims (negligence / gross negligence; intentional infliction of emotional distress) | Conduct (fabrication, press statements, long surveillance) amounted to gross negligence and extreme, outrageous conduct | Investigative acts are discretionary and immune from ordinary negligence; alleged conduct not extreme enough for IIED | Negligence claim barred by common-law qualified immunity absent gross negligence; IIED not supported; summary judgment granted on Counts 8–9 |
| Aiding and abetting tort (derivative claim) | Defendants substantially assisted primary tortfeasors in wrongful arrest/imprisonment | No specific rebuttal to aiding-and-abetting on pre-indictment arrest presented | Summary judgment denied as to aiding-and-abetting concerning the alleged false arrest and pre-indictment imprisonment (survives); denied only where primary torts failed (e.g., malicious prosecution) |
Key Cases Cited
- Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (summary-judgment standard; evidence viewed in plaintiff’s favor)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (party moving for summary judgment bears initial burden)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (genuine dispute standard for summary judgment)
- Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (probable cause assessed under totality of the circumstances)
- Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (probable cause requires a substantial chance/probability)
- Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (probable cause assessed at time of arrest)
- District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (probable cause and qualified-immunity specificity)
- Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (two-step qualified immunity framework)
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (qualified immunity standard)
- Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070 (distinguishing negligent error from intentional fabrication)
- Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062 (indictment presumption and how it may be rebutted)
- Ortiz-Hernandez, 427 F.3d 567 (probable cause may dissipate as investigation develops)
- United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (indictment not subject to challenge based on adequacy of evidence)