Mercado v. Government of PR
814 F.3d 581
1st Cir.2016Background
- Plaintiff Esther Mercado sued Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and three Puerto Rico entities under Title II of the ADA, alleging involuntary psychiatric confinement and "regarded as" disability discrimination.
- Mercado did not allege she had an actual impairment; she alleged defendants regarded her as having a physical/mental impairment and relied on the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA) in pleading her "regarded as" claims.
- Mercado filed an amended complaint in 2014; defendants moved to dismiss as time-barred, arguing Puerto Rico's one-year tort limitations period applied.
- The key statutory question was whether 28 U.S.C. § 1658's four-year federal "catch-all" limitations period applies to claims "arising under" federal statutes enacted after Dec. 1, 1990, because Mercado's claims depend on the ADAAA (2008).
- The district court applied Puerto Rico's one-year limitations period, dismissed the complaint as untimely, and Mercado appealed solely on the § 1658 limitations issue.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 28 U.S.C. § 1658's 4-year limitations period applies to Mercado's ADA "regarded as" claims | Mercado: Her claims "necessarily depend" on the ADAAA (2008), a post-1990 enactment that broadened "regarded as" liability, so § 1658 applies and her suit is timely | Defendants: ADA was enacted in 1990; ADAAA merely clarified preexisting law (or Mercado's complaint pleads a "major" impairment that would have been actionable pre-ADAAA), so state 1-year limit applies | Held: § 1658 applies because the ADAAA substantively broadened the "regarded as" prong and "made possible" Mercado's claims; reversed dismissal and remanded |
| Whether factual allegations (reference to a "major" impairment) mean Mercado's claims could have been brought under pre-ADAAA ADA | Mercado: She pleads the post-ADAAA, broader claim and thus depends on the ADAAA | Defendants: The complaint's reference to a "major" impairment shows the claim would have been actionable pre-ADAAA, so § 1658 not triggered | Held: Court rejects this as dispositive; plaintiffs may rely on the broader post-ADAAA claim and § 1658 applies despite overlapping factual allegations |
Key Cases Cited
- Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004) (§ 1658 applies when a claim "necessarily depends" on a post-1990 enactment that "made possible" the claim)
- Millay v. Me. Dep't of Labor, 762 F.3d 152 (1st Cir. 2014) (post-enactment changes that create substantive or remedial avenues can trigger § 1658)
- Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (Supreme Court decision constraining § 1981 that later Congress enlarged by amendment)
- Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014) (standard of de novo review for statutory interpretation)