MERAS v. Sisto
676 F.3d 1184
9th Cir.2012Background
- Meras, a California prisoner, was convicted of robbery, burglary, and assault with a deadly weapon based on DNA evidence from blood on a pair of jeans found in his apartment.
- Criminalist Jennai Lawson performed DNA analysis and prepared a lab report identifying the DNA as Peabody's; Lawson testified in Meras's first trial.
- In Meras's second trial, Lawson was unavailable to testify; the state called her supervisor, Jill Spriggs, to testify to the contents of Lawson's report under the hearsay exception.
- The trial court admitted Lawson's report through Spriggs under the business records hearsay exception, allowing Spriggs to summarize the report's contents for the jury.
- The California Court of Appeal affirmed Meras's conviction, the California Supreme Court denied review, and Meras filed a federal habeas petition challenging the Confrontation Clause ruling.
- The district court denied the habeas petition; the Ninth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability on whether admitting a non-testifying expert's lab report violated the Sixth Amendment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the lab report is testimonial under Crawford. | Meras contends the report is testimonial and its introduction violated the Confrontation Clause. | Sisto argues the report falls outside Crawford as non-testimonial when admitted via business records or supervisor testimony. | No clear, reasonable application of Crawford established; state court not unreasonable under AEDPA. |
| Whether Lawson’s unavailability at retrial satisfied the Crawford exception. | Lawson's absence, due to caring for a dying mother, could render unavailability insufficient or unclear. | The State attempted good-faith measures; Lawson's unavailability may meet the exception since she testified at the first trial. | Unresolved factual record; AEDPA deferential standard prevents decision as to unavailability. |
| Whether Spriggs’s supervisor testimony could satisfy the Crawford supervisor exception (Bullcoming line). | Spriggs, as Lawson's supervisor, might substitute for the primary analyst. | Bullcoming left open whether a supervisor’s testimony suffices; record insufficient to decide. | Unresolved question; not decided de novo; deferential review applied. |
| AEDPA standard: whether California court reasonably applied clearly established federal law. | Crawford clearly established the rule that testimonial statements require confrontation. | State court could reasonably apply Crawford given the unsettled expert-testimony landscape. | California court did not unreasonably apply Crawford; affirmed denial of writ. |
Key Cases Cited
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (U.S. 2004) (confrontation right applies to testimonial statements unless unavailable and cross-examined)
- Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (U.S. 2009) (forensic lab reports testimonial; confrontation needed)
- Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (S. Ct. 2011) (supervisor/alternative testimony—limited reach; live witness required)
- Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38 (S. Ct. 2011) (AEDPA review of clearly established federal law as of state-court decision)
- Ocampo v. Vail, 649 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2011) (mentioned as context for Crawford-related standards)
- Bailey v. Newland, 263 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2001) (illustrates reliance on lack of clear Supreme Court standard)
- Thompson v. Battaglia, 458 F.3d 614 (7th Cir. 2006) (supports view of lack of uniform standard among courts)
- Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (S. Ct. 2011) (clear-and-convincing standard for deference in AEDPA review)
