Menges v. Collins, 633 B.R. 700

At an aunt’s birthday party on Sept. 30, 2017, Deborah Collins and her sister Jennifer Menges argued, went outside, and a physical altercation occurred on the front lawn in which Jennifer sustained a serious right-knee injury.
Eyewitnesses (the aunt and Jennifer’s husband) testified that Deborah pushed/tackled Jennifer from behind in the middle of the lawn; Deborah claimed she accidentally fell on Jennifer at the door and could not recall how she tripped.
Deborah pled guilty in Bucks County to simple assault by mutual combat and disorderly conduct, admitting she tackled Jennifer and caused swelling to Jennifer’s knee; she was not prosecuted as to any claims that Jennifer provoked the assault.
Jennifer obtained a default civil judgment and an arbitration award for $50,000 against Deborah based on the same incident.
Deborah filed bankruptcy (converted to Chapter 13); Jennifer filed an adversary proceeding seeking a declaration that the $50,000 arbitration award is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).
After a bench trial (witnesses sequestered; court found the aunt’s account especially credible), the bankruptcy court held the award nondischargeable, finding Deborah willfully and maliciously injured Jennifer.

Issue	Menges' Argument	Collins' Argument	Held
Whether the $50,000 arbitration award is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)	The shove/tackle was intentional and substantially certain to cause injury, so the debt is for a willful and malicious injury	The injury was accidental — Collins tripped/fell onto Menges, so it was not willful or malicious	Award is nondischargeable: court found push/tackle intentional, without justification, and willful and malicious under § 523(a)(6)
Whether facts from Collins’ guilty plea or the criminal case preclude relitigation or alter the nondischargeability analysis	Not binding on dischargeability but corroborative of intentional conduct	Collins noted plea was to mutual combat and argued lack of requisite scienter for § 523(a)(6)	Court used the guilty-plea facts as consistent with its findings but observed guilty pleas do not automatically satisfy § 523(a)(6); here independent trial evidence supported willfulness and malice

Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (1998) (§ 523(a)(6) reaches only "willful and malicious" injuries; negligent or reckless injuries do not qualify)
Carmelo v. Mickletz (In re Mickletz), 544 B.R. 804 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2016) (exceptions to discharge construed narrowly; willfulness includes acts substantially certain to cause injury)
Beard Research, Inc. v. Kates (In re Kates), 485 B.R. 86 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2012) (plaintiff must prove willful and malicious injury by preponderance; willful = deliberate injury, not merely deliberate act)
In re Fleisch, 543 B.R. 166 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2015) (reckless behavior does not satisfy § 523(a)(6) willfulness requirement)
Kleman v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 322 B.R. 306 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2004) (physical acts that plainly inflict significant injury can satisfy willfulness element)
Columbia Medical Group, Inc. v. Herring & Roll, P.C., 829 A.2d 1184 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (principles on collateral estoppel and preclusive effect of prior proceedings)
Commonwealth v. Hines, 496 Pa. 555 (Pa. 1981) (court must establish factual basis before accepting a guilty plea)
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Kiesewetter, 585 Pa. 477 (Pa. 2005) (preclusion principles require party or privity in prior case for collateral estoppel to apply)