Mendez v. Mid-Wilshire Health Care Ctr. CA2/7
220 Cal. App. 4th 534
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2013Background
- Mendez was hired as a nurse's assistant in January 1985 and was a union member.
- Defendant Mid-Wilshire terminated Mendez on March 17, 2009; the reason for termination is not clarified in the record.
- Mendez filed suit November 19, 2010 asserting common law and FEHA claims based on disability and age discrimination and failure to provide reasonable accommodation.
- Mid-Wilshire moved to compel arbitration under a grievance and arbitration provision in two collective bargaining agreements (CBAs).
- The arbitration provision is framed in Article 19 of the CBA as a multi-step process leading to arbitration, with a discretionary “may appeal” language at Step Four.
- Trial court denied arbitration of FEHA claims as not clearly covered by the CBA; remaining claims were not clearly argued on appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Mendez was bound by the CBA to arbitrate | Mendez was not a party to the CBA and thus not bound. | Mendez, as a union member, is bound through unit membership and retroactive application of CBAs. | Mendez bound; union membership suffices to bind to CBA terms. |
| Arbitrability of FEHA claims under the CBA | FEHA claims are not arbitrable because the CBA does not clearly reference FEHA. | The CBA’s broad language plus explicit incorporation of statutes makes FEHA claims arbitrable. | FEHA claims are not arbitrable because the CBA lacks clear and unmistakable waiver of judicial rights for statutory discrimination claims. |
| Whether the arbitration clause is explicit enough under Wright/14 Penn Plaza as to statutorily-based discrimination claims | General arbitration language suffices when coupled with explicit incorporation of statutory requirements. | General language is insufficient without explicit statutory incorporation or statute-specific references. | Clause is not explicit enough to mandate arbitration of FEHA claims; not a clear waiver. |
| Effect of Concepcion on Vasquez framework | Concepcion undermines Vasquez; FAA preempts state-law limits on arbitration. | Concepcion does not overrule Wright/14 Penn Plaza/Vasquez; federal law still supports requiring explicit waivers for statutory claims. | Concepcion does not overrule controlling precedents; Vasquez remains good law for requiring explicit waivers. |
| Disposition of non-arbitrable vs. arbitrable claims | All FEHA claims should be arbitrable if the CBA intends broad arbitration. | Only arbitrable if the waiver is explicit; common law claims do not rise to this issue. | FEHA claims not arbitrable; remaining common law claims preserved for litigation. |
Key Cases Cited
- Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998) (statutory claims require explicit waiver to arbitrate)
- 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009) (explicit waiver required for statutory antidiscrimination claims)
- Vasquez v. Superior Court, 80 Cal.App.4th 430 (2000) (broad clauses require explicit incorporation of statutes to arbitrate statutory claims)
- AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (FAA preemption concerns; class arbitration decisions)
- Flores v. Axxis Network & Telecommunications, Inc., 173 Cal.App.4th 802 (2009) (statutory claims require clear incorporation to be arbitrable)
- City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 56 Cal.4th 1086 (2013) (cites Wright; discusses arbitrability framework post-Concepcion)