Menard v. State
208 Conn. App. 303
| Conn. App. Ct. | 2021Background
- On Sept. 1, 2012 three Connecticut state troopers were struck when a third party rear‑ended a parked cruiser, causing injuries; Menard and Connolly sued the State (a self‑insurer) for underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits under § 38a‑336.
- The trial court found the tortfeasor negligent, calculated the troopers’ damages, but (1) rejected PTSD damages as noncompensable under § 38a‑336 and (2) reserved offsets until a later hearing.
- Parties later stipulated to sums each trooper had received (workers’ compensation, tortfeasor payments, dram‑shop recoveries, and other UIM proceeds); the court reduced damages by workers’ compensation but declined to deduct dram‑shop recoveries.
- Plaintiffs filed an initial appeal before the judgment reductions were entered (dismissed for lack of final judgment); an amended appeal (after judgments entered) and the State’s cross‑appeal were properly before the court.
- This panel affirmed that PTSD claims unaccompanied by physical injury are not "bodily injury" under § 38a‑336, held the State could offset UIM liability by workers’ compensation because a pre‑accident writing was maintained, and ruled the court erred in refusing to deduct Connolly’s dram‑shop recovery (preventing double recovery).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was the original December 3, 2018 appeal from a final judgment? | The appeal was proper. | No final judgments were entered until the court accounted for stipulated offsets. | Original appeal dismissed for lack of final judgment; amended appeal (filed after May 16, 2019 judgments) was timely and encompasses prior claims. |
| Are PTSD claims (purely emotional, even with physical manifestations) compensable as "bodily injury" under § 38a‑336? | PTSD with physical manifestations qualifies as "bodily injury." | "Bodily" modifies injury and denotes physical/corporeal harm; pure emotional injuries are excluded. | Held for State: "bodily injury" requires physical injury; PTSD alone (or with accompanying physiological symptoms) does not convert into compensable "bodily injury" under § 38a‑336 (Moore controlling). |
| May a self‑insurer (the State) rely on a preaccident written election to offset UIM limits by workers’ compensation without giving notice to employees? | State must notify employees (parallel to commercial insurer policy disclosure). | Piersa/Garcia require a preaccident writing for self‑insurers but do not require claimant notice; maintaining the memorandum in files suffices. | Held for State: preaccident writing in the State’s files satisfied Piersa/Garcia; no statutory/regulatory requirement to notify claimants. |
| Must a dram‑shop recovery be deducted from UIM damages to avoid double recovery? | DelGreco bars reduction of insurer’s coverage limits by dram‑shop payments; thus dram‑shop sums need not reduce damages. | Where dram‑shop recovery would produce double recovery, damages should be reduced to prevent duplicate compensation. | Held for State: DelGreco addressed reduction of insurer coverage limits, not prevention of double recovery; Connolly’s dram‑shop recovery must be deducted to avoid impermissible double recovery (so his damages reduce to zero). |
Key Cases Cited
- Moore v. Continental Casualty Co., 252 Conn. 405 (Conn. 2000) ("bodily" implies physical/corporeal harm; emotional distress alone is not "bodily injury")
- Piersa v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 273 Conn. 519 (Conn. 2005) (self‑insurer must have preaccident writing to effectuate permissible regulatory offsets)
- Garcia v. Bridgeport, 306 Conn. 340 (Conn. 2012) (clarifies Piersa; § 38a‑334‑6 is a substantive limit‑of‑liability regulation, not a notice provision; self‑insurer must maintain written election)
- American Universal Ins. Co. v. DelGreco, 205 Conn. 178 (Conn. 1987) (dram‑shop payments are not "bodily injury liability" payments that reduce insurer’s UIM coverage limits)
- Gionfriddo v. Gartenhaus Cafe, 211 Conn. 67 (Conn. 1989) (reiterates single‑recovery rule; plaintiff may not recover twice for same injuries)
- Vitti v. Allstate Ins. Co., 245 Conn. 169 (Conn. 1998) (§ 38a‑336(b) reflects the policy against duplicate recoveries under UIM scheme)