Menard, Inc. v. Textron Aviation, Inc.
3:18-cv-00844
W.D. Wis.Oct 14, 2020Background
- Menard, Inc. sued Dallas Airmotive, Inc. (DAI) and Textron Aviation for negligence and breach of contract arising from overhaul of two aircraft engines; DAI counterclaimed for tortious interference and defamation based on Menards’ mailing ~119 letters to other owners.
- Final Pretrial Conference held Sept. 11, 2020; court issued rulings on multiple reserved motions in limine and evidentiary disputes and continued some issues to Oct. 15, 2020.
- Court allowed DAI to pursue lost-business damages based on a proffer that GRP’s unusual silence could permit a jury inference of causation, while preserving Menards’ ability to impeach that testimony with business records (but not for the truth of out-of-record GRP statements).
- Court limited expert use of a third-party investigator Ming Zhou’s report: experts may rely on and mention Zhou only for the uncontested finding that bolts were made of Waspaloy; other Zhou findings are excluded.
- Evidence of DAI’s post-overhaul process changes is admissible for limited purpose (DAI’s belief that bolt defects caused failures) with a curative jury instruction; Menards’ attempt to exclude a proposed $565,000 sale offer was denied but a mitigation instruction was adopted.
- The court refused to submit a separate negligence instruction against Textron (finding Menards offered no independent duty beyond the contract) but will allow DAI to attempt to allocate fault to Pratt & Whitney (burden on DAI to prove that). The applicability of the absolute judicial-immunity/abuse-of-privilege instruction was reserved.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of DAI lost-business damages (causation/Rule 26) | Menards argued proffer insufficient for causation and disclosure defects under Rule 26 | DAI argued proffered testimony about GRP’s unusual silence permits jury inference; damages timely disclosed | Court allowed DAI to pursue lost-business damages; jury may determine causation; disclosure OK; Menards can impeach with business records but not as hearsay truth |
| Exclusion of $565,000 aircraft sale proposal (mitigation) | Menards sought exclusion as prejudicial | DAI opposed exclusion | Court denied exclusion and adopted Menards’ curative mitigation instruction for jury consideration |
| Use of Ming Zhou investigative report by DAI experts | Menards sought exclusion of undisclosed third‑party reports and hearsay | DAI said experts relied on Zhou and disclosed reliance in reports | Court limited experts to reference Zhou only for the Waspaloy bolt finding; other Zhou conclusions excluded |
| Evidence of DAI processes adopted post‑overhaul | Menards sought exclusion | DAI said processes reflect belief about bolt defects | Court admitted evidence for limited purpose with a limiting instruction (not proof of negligence) |
| Remote testimony, sealing, exhibit admission requests | Menards did not oppose video testimony; opposed sealing without record | DAI sought video testimony and other protections | Court granted video testimony for two witnesses; other sealing and exhibit requests denied without prejudice pending trial record |
| Negligence claim against Textron (independent duty) | Menards: ICNA permits negligence for services; Textron assumed duties in brokering repairs | Textron: no duty independent of contractual relationship; negligence is mere contract performance | Court declined to instruct negligence claim against Textron — Menards failed to identify duty independent of contract |
| Allocation of fault to Pratt & Whitney | Menards not required to prove non-party negligence | DAI sought instruction to allocate comparative negligence to Pratt & Whitney | Court will allow jury to assign fault to Pratt & Whitney but burden to prove such negligence is on DAI |
| Defamation instruction and abuse‑of‑privilege (judicial immunity) | Menards sought instruction that a statement "false by implication" is actionable; argued judicial‑immunity privilege is absolute | DAI argued Menards’ wording is misleading and privilege may apply only if recipients were closely connected to proceedings | Court included Menards’ false‑by‑implication language; reserved ruling on abuse‑of‑privilege and will hear further argument |
Key Cases Cited
- Insurance Co. of North America v. Cease Electric Inc., 688 N.W.2d 462 (Wis. 2004) (economic‑loss doctrine inapplicable to negligent provision of services)
- Landwehr v. Citizens Tr. Co., 329 N.W.2d 411 (Wis. 1983) (tort requires duty independent of contract performance)
- Kuhlman, Inc. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 266 N.W.2d 382 (Wis. 1978) (reasonableness of mitigation efforts for damages)
- Rady v. Lutz, 444 N.W.2d 58 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (absolute privilege applies when maker and recipient are closely connected to proceeding)
- Converters Equip. Corp. v. Condes Corp., 258 N.W.2d 712 (Wis. 1977) (discussing limits of absolute privilege for statements preliminary to or during judicial proceedings)
- Steel v. Pace Setter Motor Cars, Inc., 672 N.W.2d 141 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003) (delegation of contractual duties does not necessarily eliminate liability for breach)