Memphis A. Phillip Randolph Institute v. Hargett, 485 F.Supp.3d 959

Plaintiffs (including Memphis A. Philip Randolph Institute and NAACP) sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin Tennessee’s “first-time voter restriction” (Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-2-115(b)(7)) that requires voters who registered by mail or online and have never voted in the jurisdiction to vote in person the first time they vote.
Plaintiffs challenged the restriction as violating the First Amendment right to vote; they did not seek to enjoin the broader absentee eligibility rules that were the subject of separate state-court litigation.
Parallel Davidson County Chancery Court litigation produced a temporary injunction expanding absentee access during COVID-19, but the Tennessee Supreme Court later vacated that injunction; the State conceded it would treat certain COVID-vulnerable voters as eligible for absentee ballots.
The court found at least one organizational plaintiff had associational standing via NAACP member Corey Sweet, who registered online and fears in-person voting because of COVID-19 and thus would be barred from voting absentee by the restriction.
Applying the Anderson-Burdick framework, the court held the restriction imposes a moderate burden and that Tennessee failed to justify it by legitimate, sufficiently weighty interests; it granted a preliminary injunction against enforcement of § 2-2-115(b)(7) for the November 3, 2020 general election.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing to challenge first-time voter restriction	NAACP member Sweet is injured because restriction prevents absentee voting and threatens health or forces forfeiture of vote	Defendants argued organizational plaintiffs had not identified harmed members	Court found Sweet has associational standing and proceeded to merits
Level of constitutional scrutiny under Anderson-Burdick	Restriction so burdensome in pandemic that it is severe and requires strict scrutiny	Restriction implements federal statutes; burden is not severe	Court characterized burden as moderate and applied intermediate-style balancing
State interests justifying the restriction	Plaintiffs did not dispute legitimate interests but argued they do not justify the restriction	Defendants relied primarily on compliance with NVRA and HAVA and congressional intent to require ID for first-time mail registrants	Court found Defendants’ reliance on NVRA/HAVA as requiring an in-person first-time rule illusory; only ID interest legitimate but could be satisfied by mailing ID, so the restriction is not justified
Irreparable harm and balance of equities	Denial of voting rights constitutes irreparable harm and public interest favors injunction	State warned of election-administration disruption and last-minute changes	Court held irreparable injury presumed when fundamental right likely violated; public interest and equities favor preliminary injunction despite administrative concerns

Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (announces Anderson-Burdick balancing framework for election regulations)
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (explains balancing of burdens on voting against state interests)
Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2012) (applies Anderson-Burdick to voting regulations and rejection of McDonald where plaintiffs showed prevented voting)
McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802 (1969) (held absentee-voting limitations may be subject to rational-basis review when they do not prevent voting)
Mays v. LaRose, 951 F.3d 775 (6th Cir. 2020) (characterizes some voting burdens as intermediate rather than severe)
Libertarian Party of Ky. v. Grimes, 835 F.3d 570 (6th Cir. 2016) (states hallmark of a severe burden is exclusion or virtual exclusion from voting)
Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (discusses identification of burdens on voting)
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (recognizes compelling state interest in election integrity)
Texas Democratic Party v. Abbott, 961 F.3d 289 (5th Cir. 2020) (COVID-era voting measures and limits on expanding mail voting)