482 F.Supp.3d 673
M.D. Tenn.2020Background:
- Plaintiffs (including Memphis A. Philip Randolph Institute) sued Tennessee election officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking a preliminary injunction to bar enforcement of Tennessee’s absentee ballot signature-verification regime (Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 2-6-202(g), 2-6-204) that allows rejection for signature mismatch without notice and cure.
- The state’s system requires (often) two signature comparisons (application/request and ballot affidavit), trained reviewers, and a presumption favoring acceptance (local review by multiple officials is required before rejection).
- Plaintiffs pressed procedural due process and First Amendment / fundamental right-to-vote challenges to the signature-verification system; the court treated part of the challenge as substantive (criteria) and part as procedural (implementation/accuracy).
- The court previously denied portions of Plaintiffs’ motion (laches re: pre-primary relief; denial as to unsolicited absentee-application statute) and here addressed only the signature-verification claim for November 3, 2020 election.
- The district court denied the preliminary injunction as to the signature-verification system, holding Plaintiffs unlikely to succeed: (1) the right to vote is not a cognizable liberty interest for procedural-due-process purposes under Sixth Circuit precedent, (2) under Anderson–Burdick the signature-match requirement imposes at most a moderate burden that the State’s integrity interests justify, and (3) Plaintiffs failed to show likely irreparable harm (historical rejection rate ~0.03%).
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the right to vote is a cognizable liberty interest for procedural-due-process purposes | Right to vote (and state-created absentee-vote entitlement) creates a liberty interest; thus procedures (notice/cure) are required before ballots are rejected | Brunner and related precedent show the right to vote is not a procedural-due-process liberty interest; no pre-deprivation hearing requirement | Court: Right to vote is not a cognizable liberty interest for procedural due process here; claim likely fails |
| Whether the signature-match requirement imposes a severe burden on the right to vote (Anderson–Burdick) | Requirement and practice cause summary rejection of absentee ballots without notice/cure, amounting to exclusion or virtual exclusion from the ballot (severe burden) | The burden is limited: signing and comparison is reasonable; alternative voting options exist; state has strong interests in election integrity | Court: Burden is at most intermediate/moderate; State’s interests in preventing fraud and ensuring orderly elections outweigh burden; plaintiffs unlikely to succeed |
| Whether plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm absent injunction | Risk of erroneous rejections (especially during pandemic with increased mail voting) can cause irreparable harm to voters and organizational members | Historical data show extremely low rejection rates for signature mismatches (≈0.03%), so individualized, imminent irreparable injury is unlikely | Court: Plaintiffs failed to show likely irreparable injury; this factor defeats preliminary relief |
| Whether equities/public interest and timing permit altering election rules close to election | Pandemic makes mail voting essential; injunctive relief needed to protect ballots | Courts should avoid changing election rules on the eve of an election; public interest favors preserving orderly election administration | Court: Declined to alter rules on eve of election; balance of equities/public interest weigh against injunction |
Key Cases Cited
- Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (procedural due process protects state-created property/liberty interests and requires adequate procedures before deprivation)
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (three-factor balancing test to determine what process is due)
- Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (narrow circumstances in which state-created liberty interests arise)
- Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990) (procedural due process bars deprivation without constitutionally adequate procedures)
- League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner, 548 F.3d 463 (6th Cir. 2008) (right to vote may support substantive claim but does not create a procedural-due-process liberty interest)
- Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (identify and weigh burdens on voting rights against state interests)
- Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (regulatory burdens on voting are evaluated on a sliding scale between rational basis and strict scrutiny)
- Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (voter-ID requirement held to impose only limited burden in context)
- Mays v. LaRose, 951 F.3d 775 (6th Cir. 2020) (intermediate burden where alternative voting opportunities exist)
- Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (States have compelling interests in preserving election integrity)