969 F.3d 685
6th Cir.2020Background
- Melvin Wofford was tried (Aug. 2013) for a 1993 murder after DNA linked him to hairs and blood at the scene; the jury began deliberations and reported an 11–1 split and subsequent acrimony.
- During deliberations a juror (Juror M) allegedly consulted outside materials, then retained an attorney who appeared in court to report harassment in the jury room; the trial judge excused Juror M for violating repeated instructions not to discuss the case with outsiders and seated an alternate, ordering the jury to begin deliberations anew.
- The reconstituted jury convicted within about 90 minutes; Wofford appealed and the Michigan Court of Appeals (MCOA) affirmed under state precedent (People v. Tate and Dry Land Marina), finding removal was for misconduct, not for being a holdout.
- Wofford filed for habeas relief; the district court found (1) the MCOA had overlooked his Sixth Amendment claim and (2) under the Brown/Thomas/Symington "reasonable possibility" prophylactic rule the juror’s removal violated the Sixth Amendment, and granted the writ.
- On appeal the Sixth Circuit (this opinion) upheld the district court’s factual findings (that Juror M was the lone holdout and was removed for contacting counsel), but reversed the grant of habeas: AEDPA deference applied and Michigan’s actual-prejudice standard was a permissible state choice distinct from the federal prophylactic rule.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the MCOA overlooked Wofford’s Sixth Amendment claim so AEDPA deference does not apply | Wofford: MCOA failed to address federal Brown/Thomas/Symington line; de novo habeas review appropriate | State: MCOA relied on Tate/Dry Land (which considered Sixth Amendment concerns); Johnson presumption applies and AEDPA deference is required | Sixth Circuit: MCOA considered the constitutional dimension; AEDPA applies (district erred in treating the claim as overlooked) |
| Whether removing Juror M violated the Sixth Amendment by removing a holdout | Wofford: dismissal was motivated by juror’s dissent and thus prevented a jury decision by the original panel | State: judge removed Juror M for flagrant misconduct (retaining counsel, breaching instructions), not for her views; alternate instructed to deliberate anew | Court: factual finding that removal was for misconduct (not impermissible because of views) is upheld |
| Whether the Brown/Thomas/Symington prophylactic rule governs and requires reversal when there is any reasonable possibility removal related to juror’s views | Wofford/district: apply Brown line; any reasonable possibility that dismissal flowed from merits requires reversal | State: Brown line is not Supreme Court “clearly established” law binding under AEDPA; states may adopt an actual-prejudice rule | Held: Brown-type prophylactic rule is not clearly established Supreme Court law; cannot be imposed on Michigan under AEDPA; Michigan's approach is permissible |
| Remedy and result after habeas grant | Wofford: retrial or release ordered by district court | State: appealed grant of writ | Held: Sixth Circuit reverses habeas grant and remands for proceedings consistent with opinion |
Key Cases Cited
- Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020) (holds unanimity is among substantive requirements of a "trial by an impartial jury")
- Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289 (2013) (state-court adjudication of federal claims is presumptively on the merits; narrow "inadvertently overlooked" exception to AEDPA deference)
- United States v. Brown, 823 F.2d 591 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (prophylactic rule: deny dismissal if any possibility removal stems from juror’s doubts about sufficiency)
- United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606 (2d Cir. 1997) (adopts prophylactic protection against dismissing holdout jurors skeptical of prosecution)
- United States v. Symington, 195 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 1999) (articulates "reasonable possibility" prophylactic test for juror dismissal)
- People v. Dry Land Marina, Inc., 437 N.W.2d 391 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (Michigan precedent requiring actual constitutional violation/prejudice review and approving limited use of alternates)
- People v. Tate, 624 N.W.2d 524 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (frames judge’s discretion balancing defendant’s interest in retaining original jury and right to a fair, cooperative jury)
- United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1981) (federal case rejecting automatic reversal when alternate is seated; examines coercion and prejudice)