Melvin v. Jennings
N21M-07-036 CEB
| Del. Super. Ct. | Dec 21, 2021Background:
- Petitioner Charles Melvin, convicted of home invasion, theft, and weapons offenses, is serving a 14-year sentence at James T. Vaughn Correctional Center (JTVCC).
- Melvin filed a pro se petition for a writ of mandamus asking the Attorney General to “schedule a hearing” to reduce his sentence and place him on probation, claiming risk of contracting COVID-19 and asserting an Eighth Amendment violation.
- The petition was filed more than three years after conviction; remedies under Criminal Rule 35, Rule 61, and direct appeal are time-barred.
- The Attorney General moved to dismiss under Civil Rule 12(b)(6); the court applied standard Rule 12(b)(6) and pro se pleading principles.
- The court held mandamus inappropriate for ordering immediate release or sentence reduction, the AG lacks authority to schedule court hearings or direct DOC, DOC’s discretionary authority controls early-release decisions, and an alternative remedy (42 U.S.C. § 1983) exists.
- On the merits, the court found Melvin alleged only speculative fear of COVID-19, not a specific serious medical need or deliberate indifference by officials, so the Eighth Amendment claim failed.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Valid subject for mandamus: order immediate release or sentence reduction | Melvin seeks mandamus to obtain early release due to COVID risk | Release or sentence modification must be sought under Criminal Rules or appeal; mandamus not proper | Denied—mandamus is not the proper vehicle for sentence reduction or release |
| Proper respondent: can AG be compelled to "schedule a hearing" | Melvin treats AG as the official who can schedule a hearing/reduce sentence | AG has only statutorily enumerated duties; scheduling court hearings is not an AG power | Denied—AG is not the proper official to compel to schedule hearings |
| Clear legal right / non-discretionary duty: can DOC be ordered to release | Melvin implies entitlement to release to avoid COVID exposure | DOC has statutory authority to seek early release for "good cause" and that decision is discretionary | Denied—no clear legal right to compel discretionary DOC action |
| Necessity / alternative remedy | Melvin contends mandamus is necessary to protect his Eighth Amendment rights | Civil rights actions (42 U.S.C. § 1983) and other remedies exist | Denied—availability of alternative remedies defeats mandamus necessity |
| Eighth Amendment merits: deliberate indifference to serious medical need | Melvin alleges he is "destined" to get COVID-19 and seeks relief as cruel and unusual punishment | Speculative fear of future illness without concrete facts or special vulnerability does not show serious need or deliberate indifference | Denied—claims are speculative and fail to allege serious medical need or deliberate indifference |
Key Cases Cited
- Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference standard for prisoners' medical needs)
- Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (must show prison official knew of and disregarded substantial risk to inmate safety)
- In re State, 918 A.2d 1151 (Del. 2007) (mandamus is an extraordinary remedy with strict prerequisites)
- Brittingham v. Town of Georgetown, 113 A.3d 519 (Del. 2015) (mandamus requires ministerial duty prescribed with precision)
- Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075 (Del. 2001) (limits on drawing strained inferences from pleadings)
- Clough v. State, 686 A.2d 158 (Del. 1996) (requirement of clear legal right to compel official action)