905 F.3d 750
3rd Cir.2018Background
- In 2003 Melvin Richardson was convicted in Pennsylvania and sentenced after a two-day sentencing; during the second day he discharged his retained trial counsel (Joseph Green) and proceeded largely pro se.
- The sentencing judge never conducted a colloquy to ensure Richardson’s waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary; Richardson received a lengthy prison term (17½–39 years).
- Post-sentencing counsel (Christian Hoey) filed a motion to reconsider and pursued a direct appeal but did not challenge the judge’s failure to conduct a colloquy or assert ineffective assistance for failing to do so.
- Richardson raised the issue in a PCRA (state-habeas) petition; appointed PCRA counsel (Robert Brendza) declined to pursue the post-sentencing-counsel claim and the PCRA court refused to consider pro se filings alongside counsel’s representation.
- On federal habeas Richardson argued layered ineffective assistance: (1) trial/post-sentencing counsel Hoey was ineffective for not challenging the lack of colloquy; (2) PCRA counsel Brendza was ineffective for not raising Hoey’s ineffectiveness, invoking Martinez v. Ryan to excuse procedural default.
- The Third Circuit held that (a) post-sentencing motions in Pennsylvania are a critical stage implicating the Sixth Amendment, (b) the Martinez exception applies to post-sentencing (trial-side) counsel because the boundary between trial and appeal is the effective notice of appeal, and (c) both Brendza and Hoey were constitutionally ineffective; the Court remanded for a new sentencing hearing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Martinez equitable exception can excuse procedural default for failure of state-habeas counsel to raise post-sentencing-counsel ineffectiveness | Martinez applies because state procedure requires raising ineffective-assistance claims at PCRA and Brendza’s failure caused the default | Martinez doesn’t extend to appellate/post-sentencing contexts; default not excused | Martinez applies here because post-sentencing counsel is trial-side; Brendza’s failure excuses the default |
| Whether post-sentencing motions in Pennsylvania are a Sixth Amendment critical stage requiring counsel | Post-sentencing motions can affect preservation of issues and permit new evidence—counsel necessary | State argued critical-stage line is at oral pronouncement of sentence, not post-sentencing motions | Post-sentencing motions are a critical stage; the dividing line is the effective notice of appeal, so counsel is required |
| Whether Brendza (PCRA counsel) performed deficiently by not raising Hoey’s ineffectiveness | Brendza reviewed record but unreasonably rejected an obvious, record-based claim; performance was deficient | Brendza made a reasonable tactical choice; no deficiency excusing default | Brendza’s performance was deficient for failing to raise the clear colloquy error |
| Whether Hoey (post-sentencing counsel) was ineffective and caused prejudice by not challenging the lack of colloquy at sentencing | Hoey should have raised the colloquy error; failing to do so was deficient and prejudicial because relief on appeal/post-sentencing would likely have yielded a remand for resentencing | District Court said no prejudice because no new evidence was presented on day two and sentence would have been the same | Hoey was ineffective and prejudice is shown (relief would have been remand for new sentencing); Richardson entitled to a new sentencing hearing |
Key Cases Cited
- Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) (equitable exception permitting federal review of trial-counsel IAC claims when state collateral counsel was ineffective)
- Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058 (2017) (declining to extend Martinez to appellate-counsel ineffectiveness)
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (procedural-default and independent adequate state ground doctrine)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong ineffectiveness-of-counsel test)
- Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (right to counsel at critical stages to preserve rights such as appeal)
- Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56 (1982) (notice of appeal divests district court and confers jurisdiction on appellate court)
- Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012) (right to counsel extends to sentencing-related proceedings)
- United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) (structural errors and circumstances permitting presumed prejudice)