Melvin Pierre Jr. v. State
05-15-00167-CR
| Tex. App. | Dec 2, 2016Background
- Victim (JB) was 15; appellant Melvin Pierre Jr. was in his 40s and admitted during a videotaped interview that he and others had sexual contact with JB; victim testified to multiple incidents including vaginal intercourse and oral sex.
- Video evidence: co-defendant Malik recorded some assaults on his phone; victim reported incidents to Detective Chris Jones while in juvenile detention.
- Pierre surrendered to Collin County police before leaving for his father’s funeral; during booking/interview he expressed concern about missing the funeral and Detective Jones said, “We will see what we can do.”
- Pierre moved to suppress his statement alleging mental incapacity and that Jones’s funeral comment coerced his confession; the trial court deferred ruling until bench trial, later denying suppression and finding Pierre guilty of sexual assault of a child; sentence: 20 years.
- Trial court excluded a defense exhibit containing school records and a letter from Pierre’s father as hearsay and not properly authenticated; Pierre appealed claiming insufficiency of evidence, involuntary statement (federal and state standards), and erroneous exclusion of evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Pierre) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence to convict of sexual assault of a child | JB’s testimony alone is sufficient to prove sexual assault; combined evidence supports verdict | No physical evidence; victim inconsistent and not credible, so evidence insufficient | Affirmed; victim’s testimony sufficient to support conviction (Jackson/Lee principles) |
| Voluntariness under U.S. Due Process (Fifth Amendment) | No coercive police misconduct (no prolonged interrogation, threats, or physical abuse); statements were voluntary | Pierre lacked mental capacity and was coerced by implied promise re: funeral | Affirmed; no federal due-process coercion shown (Oursbourn standard) |
| Voluntariness under Texas statutory law (Art. 38.21/38.22) | Totality of circumstances show voluntary waiver; mental disability considered but record showed capacity; funeral comment was vague and not a positive promise | Pierre lacked capacity to understand Miranda warnings and was induced by promise to attend funeral | Affirmed; trial court’s factual findings (capacity, no positive promise) supported; statement admissible under article 38.21 |
| Exclusion of school records and father’s letter (business‑records/hearsay) | Records not authenticated as business records; multi-level hearsay not independently admissible | Records are business records kept by mother as homemaker and admissible under Rule 803(6) | Affirmed; trial court did not abuse discretion—hearsay and lack of proper foundation/authentication |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (establishes sufficiency standard for criminal convictions)
- Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (weighing evidence and inferences under sufficiency review)
- Lee v. State, 186 S.W.3d 649 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006) (victim testimony alone can support sexual-assault conviction)
- Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (distinguishes federal due-process voluntariness and state statutory voluntariness analysis)
- Martinez v. State, 127 S.W.3d 792 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (promise must be positive and influential to render confession involuntary)
- Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (general offers of leniency typically do not render confession involuntary)
- Delao v. State, 235 S.W.3d 235 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (totality of circumstances test for voluntariness)
- Garcia v. State, 126 S.W.3d 921 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (business‑records exception does not cover out‑of‑business statements by third parties)