147 N.E.3d 394
Ind. Ct. App.2020Background
- Hall worked at Central Indiana Protection Agency (CIPA), left to form competing security companies, and was later charged with impersonating an officer; he was acquitted at trial.
- Hall sued CIPA, its owners/officers Shaw and Narducci, and others for defamation, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and IIED.
- Hall alleges a coordinated campaign (false reports, media statements, and witnesses) aimed at destroying his business and prompting criminal charges.
- After suit was filed, Narducci filed a consumer complaint with the Attorney General (July 2018) and left an aggressive voicemail (July 31, 2018); the AG complaint was dismissed.
- The trial court granted dismissal of all claims against Shaw and CIPA, denied dismissal of certain claims against Narducci (AG complaint–based defamation/abuse and voicemail–based IIED), and denied attorney’s fees; both sides appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Absolute‑privilege for Narducci’s July 2018 AG consumer complaint | Hall treated the complaint as actionable defamation/abuse of process | The complaint is a quasi‑judicial communication protected by absolute privilege | Privilege applies; defamation and abuse claims based on the AG complaint are barred |
| Statute of limitations / continuing‑wrong for pre‑May 22, 2016 defamation | Hall: the communications were a continuing wrong extending past the limitations period | Defendants: individual publications more than two years old are time‑barred | Continuing‑wrong doctrine does not apply; claims based on communications before May 22, 2016 are dismissed |
| Malicious prosecution (who caused the prosecution) | Hall: Shaw/Narducci conspired (false testimony, false reports) and caused the prosecutor to file charges | Defendants: the prosecutor independently decided to file charges, shielding them | Court: dismissal was improper at pleading stage; if Hall’s allegations prove proximate/efficient causation by defendants, malicious prosecution claim may proceed |
| Trial testimony and out‑of‑court statements by Alexander & Lolla‑Martinez | Hall: their testimony/statements were false and made at defendants’ direction as part of a conspiracy | Defendants: trial testimony is absolutely privileged; out‑of‑court statements are insufficiently specific and conspiracy not pleaded | Testimony is absolutely privileged (dismissed); alleged out‑of‑court statements are pleaded with sufficient specificity and conspiracy allegations suffice to survive dismissal |
| IIED based on Narducci’s voicemail and conspiracy liability for Shaw/CIPA | Hall: voicemail was extreme/outrageous and made in furtherance of a conspiracy, so Shaw/CIPA are liable | Defendants: voicemail/ conspiracy allegations insufficient as a matter of law | Allegations are sufficient at the pleadings stage to state IIED via conspiracy; IIED claims against Shaw and CIPA survive |
Key Cases Cited
- Hartman v. Keri, 883 N.E.2d 774 (Ind. 2008) (absolute privilege protects statements in judicial and certain quasi‑judicial proceedings)
- Trail v. Boys and Girls Clubs of Northwest Ind., 845 N.E.2d 130 (Ind. 2006) (complaint must plead operative facts and identify defamatory statements sufficiently to assess their legal character)
- Western Oil Refining Co. v. Glendenning, 156 N.E. 182 (Ind. App. 1927) (malicious‑prosecution liability requires showing defendants were proximate and efficient cause of prosecution)
- Bah v. Mac’s Convenience Stores, LLC, 37 N.E.3d 539 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (private reporter shielded where prosecutor’s independent investigation led to charges)
- Ali v. Alliance Home Health Care, LLC, 53 N.E.3d 420 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (summary judgment affirmed where prosecutor initiated charges after independent investigation)
- Donovan v. Hoosier Park, LLC, 84 N.E.3d 1198 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (defendant not liable where prosecutor, not reporting party, caused prosecution)
- Burks v. Rushmore, 534 N.E.2d 1101 (Ind. 1989) (defamation statute of limitations runs when plaintiff could reasonably ascertain injury)
- Garneau v. Bush, 838 N.E.2d 1134 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (explaining continuing‑wrong doctrine and its limits)