Melnick v. Lawrence, 1:19-cv-01550

Plaintiff Hunter Melnick, convicted of sexual assault and serving an indeterminate sentence in Colorado with parole eligibility, sued CDOC staff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including a Claim Five alleging Defendant Stansell "terminated [him] from treatment without a hearing."
Defendants moved to dismiss Claim Five; the motion was referred to Magistrate Judge Mix. Because Melnick is pro se, his pleadings were liberally construed to allege a procedural due-process claim based on termination/denial of sex-offender treatment.
Judge Mix recommended dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to plausibly allege (1) a protected liberty interest in treatment and (2) a denial of constitutionally adequate process. The district court adopted that recommendation.
The record (and earlier filings) indicated Melnick’s treatment was delayed after he allegedly refused participation, not permanently revoked, and Melnick was subsequently granted parole—undercutting a showing of a constitutionally cognizable deprivation affecting parole.
Melnick moved for reconsideration arguing district precedent (e.g., Beebe) supports a protected liberty interest where treatment is mandatory for parole; the court found no intervening law or new evidence and denied reconsideration, concluding the cited authorities are distinguishable or inapplicable.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Existence of a protected liberty interest in sex-offender treatment	Melnick: treatment is mandatory for parole in this District, so liberty interest exists	Defendants: no allegation that treatment was a mandatory prerequisite in his case; parole board retains discretion	Court: Melnick failed to plausibly allege treatment was mandatory here; no protected interest shown
Sufficiency of pleading for a Fourteenth Amendment due-process claim	Melnick: was terminated from treatment without a hearing	Defendants: allegations are vague/conclusory and do not meet Iqbal plausibility standard	Court: Complaint lacks factual detail to state a plausible due-process claim; dismissal affirmed
Whether prior cases (Beebe, Tillery, etc.) require reversal / warrant reconsideration	Melnick: district case law supports that mandatory treatment creates a liberty interest, so reconsideration warranted	Defendants: cited cases are distinguishable or inapposite; no intervening change in law or new evidence	Court: Reconsideration denied; cited cases do not compel a different outcome given the facts here

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (complaint must plead sufficient factual matter to state a plausible claim)
Farthing v. City of Shawnee, Kan., 39 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 1994) (elements of a procedural due-process claim)
Beebe v. Heil, 333 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (D. Colo. 2004) (where treatment is mandatory prerequisite to parole, withholding treatment may implicate liberty interest)
Conkleton v. Raemisch, [citation="603 F. App'x 713"] (10th Cir. 2015) (parole board retains discretion regardless of treatment criteria)
Doe v. Heil, [citation="533 F. App'x 831"] (10th Cir. 2013) (distinguishing termination of treatment from refusal to reenter a program; losing vs. not getting)
Servants of the Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005 (10th Cir. 2000) (standards for motions for reconsideration)