Mellon v. Monarch Recovery Management, Inc., 2:17-cv-02695

Three putative class actions (Mellon, Caruso, Farrell) were filed in May 2017 alleging Monarch violated the FDCPA by sending identical debt-collection form letters seeking debts under Synchrony Bank–underwritten credit cards.
Each complaint originally asserted identical classwide claims under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692(e) and 1692(g); amended complaints narrowed class definitions by specific card programs (AEO, PayPalExtras, TJX).
Monarch moved to dismiss or stay the later-filed actions (Caruso, Farrell) or, alternatively, to consolidate all three; it also sought attorneys’ fees under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k and sanctions under Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for allegedly duplicative filings.
The court found the cases raised common questions of law and fact (same form letter, same creditor, same statutory claims), the parties and counsel were largely identical, and the actions were at the same litigation stage.
The court granted consolidation under Fed. R. Civ. P. 42, ordering the cases consolidated under 17-cv-2695, and declined to dismiss or stay the later cases as duplicative once consolidated.
The court denied Monarch’s requests for fees and sanctions, concluding Monarch failed to show plaintiffs (not just counsel) acted in bad faith; counsel was cautioned about filing duplicative suits in the future.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the three actions should be consolidated under Fed. R. Civ. P. 42	Cases involve common form letter and same legal claims; consolidation appropriate to efficiently resolve class claims	Cases are duplicative but should be dismissed or stayed; consolidation only if warranted	Consolidation granted: common questions of law/fact and efficiency outweigh prejudice
Whether later-filed actions should be dismissed or stayed as duplicative	Plaintiffs opposed dismissal/stay; argued court can manage coordination	Monarch sought dismissal or stay to avoid duplicative litigation	Court denied dismissal/stay as unnecessary because consolidation resolves duplication
Whether defendant is entitled to attorneys’ fees under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) for bad-faith FDCPA suits	Plaintiffs argued claims brought in good faith on behalf of putative classes	Monarch argued suits were duplicative and brought in bad faith, warranting fees	Fees denied: defendant failed to prove plaintiffs acted in bad faith (plaintiff, not counsel, must have instituted suit in bad faith)
Whether Rule 11 or 28 U.S.C. § 1927 sanctions are appropriate for filing duplicative cases	Plaintiffs maintained filings were reasonable; not sanctionable	Monarch argued counsel multiplied proceedings vexatiously and acted in bad faith	Sanctions denied: counsel’s conduct did not rise to required bad-faith standard; caution issued to counsel

Johnson v. Celotex, 899 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1990) (Rule 42 consolidation balances efficiency against prejudice)
Hendrix v. Raybestos–Manhattan, Inc., 776 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1985) (consolidation requires common questions of law or fact)
Malcolm v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 995 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1993) (efficiency only defeated by paramount fairness concerns)
United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 948 F.2d 1338 (2d Cir. 1991) (§ 1927 sanctions require conduct akin to bad faith)
In re 60 E. 80th St. Equities, Inc., 218 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2000) (sanctions under § 1927 require bad-faith conduct)
Quintel Corp. v. Citibank, N.A., 100 F.R.D. 695 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (consolidation standards)
Solvent Chem. Co. v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 242 F. Supp. 2d 196 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) (burden on movant to show consolidation warranted)
Primavera Familienstiftung v. Askin, 173 F.R.D. 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (prejudice must outweigh efficiency for consolidation to be denied)