Melissa Kurtz, Res/cross-app. V. State Of Wa D/b/a Uw And Uw Medical Center, App/cross-res., 80686-6

Background

Plaintiff Melissa Kurtz has osteogenesis imperfecta ("brittle bone disease"), uses a wheelchair, and suffered a nonunited fracture of her left upper arm during an assisted transfer at the University of Washington Medical Center (UW).
UW had a Safe Patient Handling policy discouraging manual lifts and requiring annual training, but echosonographers assisting Kurtz had not received that training and the exam table was several inches higher than her wheelchair.
Kurtz sued UW for medical malpractice, corporate negligence (alleging failure to provide training/tools), and violation of the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD) for failure to reasonably accommodate her disability.
At trial Dr. Nirav Pandya (orthopedic surgeon) testified about the injury’s effects and opined that chore/home-care services were reasonably necessitated; lay testimony from Kurtz and her niece described post-injury functional deficits.
During deliberations a juror conducted internet research about noneconomic damages; the court discharged that juror, brought in an alternate, instructed the jury to restart deliberations, denied UW’s mistrial motion, and the jury found UW negligent and awarded economic and noneconomic damages.
On appeal UW challenged denial of mistrial, admissibility/ sufficiency of evidence for economic damages, and corporate negligence; Kurtz cross-appealed the court’s refusal to define “reasonable accommodation.” The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Juror misconduct / motion for mistrial	Jurors could disregard extrinsic internet information after curative instruction and sworn assurances; court remedied by dismissing the juror and restarting deliberations.	Juror’s external research about multiplier for noneconomic damages prejudiced verdict and warranted a mistrial; court should have explicitly found no prejudice beyond a reasonable doubt.	Trial court did not abuse discretion: curative instruction, sworn assurances, juror dismissal, and fresh deliberations sufficiently remedied misconduct.
Economic damages — admissibility and sufficiency for chore services	Pandya’s expert opinion plus Kurtz and niece lay testimony established necessity of chore services as a consequence of the unhealed fracture.	Pandya lacked personal knowledge of Kurtz’s pre-injury function, so his testimony on necessity was speculative and insufficient; JMOL should have been granted.	Admission of Pandya’s opinions was not an abuse of discretion; combined expert and lay testimony supplied sufficient evidence to submit economic damages to the jury.
Corporate negligence — standard of care and submission to jury	UW’s Safe Patient Handling policy, lack of employee training, and Pandya’s testimony showed customary practices and breached standard of care for hospitals.	Pandya lacked hospital administration credentials and therefore could not establish customary hospital practices/standard of care.	Viewing evidence favorably to Kurtz, there was adequate expert and policy-based evidence of the hospital standard of care; claim properly submitted to jury.
WLAD — instruction defining “reasonable accommodation”	Kurtz requested a jury instruction defining reasonable accommodation.	Proposed instruction misstated the law (asserting an affirmative duty arising upon awareness) and quoted a WAC provision incorrectly.	Court did not abuse discretion by refusing the proposed instruction because it misstated the law; no reversible error in instructions as given.

Key Cases Cited

Kuhn v. Schnall, 155 Wn. App. 560 (2010) (juror introduces extrinsic evidence; court must assess potential prejudice)
Lockwood v. AC&S, Inc., 109 Wn.2d 235 (1987) (curative instruction and prompt court action can mitigate juror misconduct and avoid mistrial)
Breckenridge v. Valley Gen. Hosp., 150 Wn.2d 197 (2003) (trial-court discretion in assessing juror misconduct reviewed for abuse of discretion)
Johnston-Forbes v. Matsunaga, 181 Wn.2d 346 (2014) (expert testimony admissibility: need adequate foundation; challenges may go to weight not admissibility)
Douglas v. Freeman, 117 Wn.2d 242 (1991) (corporate negligence standard of care for hospitals is based on customary and usual practices, usually proven by expert testimony)
Sing v. John L. Scott, Inc., 134 Wn.2d 24 (1997) (standard for reviewing motion for judgment as a matter of law)
Vogel v. Alaska S.S. Co., 69 Wn.2d 497 (1966) (trial court need not give a requested instruction that is erroneous in any respect)