Background - Melendez, a union security guard for the San Francisco Giants at AT&T Park since 2005, sues on behalf of similarly situated guards alleging violations of Labor Code §201 (failure to pay final wages immediately upon discharge after games, homestands, seasons, or events). - Guards are covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the union; the CBA classifies employees (regular, seasonal, senior/super senior), sets payroll rules, requires pre-hire screening, and permits discharge only for cause. - Giants present payroll practice evidence showing guards remain on payroll between events and season-to-season, and contend guards are year‑round employees under the CBA, not intermittently hired for single events. - The Giants moved to compel arbitration under the CBA and argued §301 of the Labor‑Management Relations Act (LMRA) preempts state-law claims; the trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration. - The Court of Appeal held the statutory claim did not fall within the CBA’s contractual arbitration clause but concluded §301 LMRA preemption nonetheless required resolution through the CBA grievance/arbitration process. ### Issues | Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held | |---|---:|---:|---:| | Whether the CBA’s arbitration clause covers plaintiffs’ Labor Code §201 claim | Melendez: §201 claim is a stand‑alone statutory right (citing L’Oreal); does not require interpretation of the CBA, so it is arbitrable only if the CBA covers it (plaintiff argued it does not) | Giants: Arbitration clause orients disputes over employment terms to arbitration; §201 claim arises from employment status governed by the CBA so it must be arbitrated | The court: The §201 claim does not fall within the plain scope of the CBA’s contractual arbitration definition (grievances about interpretation or violation of the CBA) | | Whether LMRA §301 preemption requires arbitration despite the contractual scope issue | Melendez: Claim can be decided under state law without interpreting the CBA; §301 does not preempt such claims (relying on Livadas, Balcorta) | Giants: Resolution of whether guards were "discharged" under §201 necessarily depends on the employment‑duration scheme in the CBA, so §301 preempts and requires arbitration | The court: §301 preemption applies because determining whether termination occurred requires interpreting the CBA’s terms and structure; therefore the dispute must be resolved through the CBA grievance/arbitration process | ### Key Cases Cited Smith v. Superior Court (L’Oreal), 39 Cal.4th 77 (2006) (an employee hired for a particular assignment is "discharged" when the assignment ends for purposes of Labor Code §§201/203) Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994) (§301 preemption does not apply when adjudication of state‑law claims does not require interpretation of the CBA) Newberry v. Pacific Racing Assn., 854 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1988) (preemption test: does the state‑law claim require interpretation of the CBA or substantially depend on its terms?) Levy v. Skywalker Sound, 108 Cal.App.4th 753 (2003) (summary of §301 preemption principles and when claims are preempted) * Flores v. Axxis Network & Telecommunications, Inc., 173 Cal.App.4th 802 (2009) (state statutory claims are not arbitrable under a CBA where the claim does not concern interpretation or application of the CBA) Disposition: Reversed — the order denying the Giants’ motion to compel arbitration is reversed; the Labor Code §201 dispute must be pursued through the CBA grievance and arbitration process under §301 preemption.