Melendez-Garcia v. Sanchez, 629 F.3d 25

Background

Meléndez, an ROTC officer, was assaulted during a campus protest at UPR-RP on April 30, 2001; PRPD had limited access due to a non-confrontation policy; the unwritten NCP allegedly restricted police entry without administrator permission.
The district court granted summary judgment on federal claims and declined to hear state claims for lack of diversity; Meléndez later challenged discovery conduct and sought sanctions or reconsideration.
Defendants produced a large set of documents (about 390,390 pages) in 2005 from a parallel state case, including a 1970 Civil Rights Commission report; Meléndez argued these documents should have been disclosed earlier in federal discovery.
Meléndez claimed discovery misconduct undermined the federal proceedings and sought default or other sanctions under Rule 37; the district court denied these sanctions.
The court later held there was no diversity between Meléndez and the defendants as of the complaint filing in April 2002; Meléndez challenged domicile determinations and moved for reconsideration of summary judgment.
The district court ruled on the merits that (a) the substantive due process and equal protection claims were defeated by qualified immunity, (b) USERRA claims could not be predicated via §1983, and (c) no basis for diversity jurisdiction existed; Meléndez appeals those rulings.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court abused discretion by denying Rule 37 sanctions.	Meléndez argues the 390,390 pages were discovery misconduct.	Defendants contend there was no order to compel discovery to sanction.	No reversible abuse; sanctions proper only with an order to provide discovery.
Whether the district court abused by denying reconsideration of summary judgment based on discovered documents.	Discovery delay prejudiced opposition to summary judgment.	No Rule 56(f) motion denied; delay did not warrant reversal.	No abuse; no applicable Rule 56(f) context present.
Whether the substantive due process claim against defendants was barred by qualified immunity.	Meléndez claims officials created/failed to protect from danger; rights were clearly established.	Conduct did not shock the conscience; rights not clearly established.	Qualified immunity affirmed; no clearly established due process violation.
Whether the equal protection claim survived qualified immunity.	Selective denial of protection against ROTC-related harms showed discriminatory intent.	Neutral nonintervention policy; no discriminatory animus shown.	Qualified immunity; no evidence of purposeful discrimination.
Whether USERRA claim can be asserted under §1983 for on-campus protection.	USERRA protections extend to employment-related benefits; denial of protection is actionable.	USERRA’s benefits of employment not implicated; plaintiff not an employee in the relevant sense.	USERRA not enforceable via §1983 for this claim; no protected benefit shown.
Whether the district court correctly determined lack of diversity jurisdiction.	Domicile in Texas as of filing; diversity existed.	Meléndez remained Puerto Rico domiciliary as of April 30, 2002.	Diversity lacked; Puerto Rico domicile prevailed as of filing.

Key Cases Cited

DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (U.S. 1989) (general rule: state failure to protect seldom violates due process unless special relationship or danger created)
Vélez-Díaz v. Vega-Irizarry, 421 F.3d 71 (1st Cir. 2005) (state-created danger and custodial theory limitations to due process claims)
Ramos-Piñero v. Puerto Rico, 453 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2006) (triage; deliberate indifference not automatically conscience-shocking)
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (U.S. 1998) (deliberate indifference must be egregious to shock conscience)
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (U.S. 2001) (two-step qualified-immunity framework; later moderated by Pearson)
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (U.S. 2009) (clearer approach: decide first whether right was clearly established; if so, assess conduct)
Hayden v. Grayson, 134 F.3d 449 (1st Cir. 1998) (equal protection requires evidence of discriminatory purpose or intent)
J.R. v. Gloria, 593 F.3d 73 (1st Cir. 2010) (applies state-created danger/limitation theory to due process; conscience-shocking standard)
Bank One, Texas, N.A. v. Montle, 964 F.2d 48 (1st Cir. 1992) (domicile and diversity determinations; presumption guidance)
Paterson-Leitch Co. v. Mass. Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 840 F.2d 985 (1st Cir. 1988) (Rule 56(f) context and need for diligence to obtain additional facts)