Melendez-Colon v. Rosado Sanchez, 995 F.3d 262

Plaintiff Luz Meléndez (and son Milton Ramos) underwent two spinal surgeries by Dr. Julio Rosado in Feb–Mar 2014 that left her bedridden and in worsening pain. A third surgery by Dr. Daniel Refai on Dec. 18, 2014 produced substantial improvement.
Plaintiffs requested but did not promptly receive Meléndez’s records from Rosado; the records were provided Aug. 22, 2014 after complaints and follow-up.
Meléndez treated in Georgia with Refai beginning Nov. 2014; Plaintiffs asked Refai to review prior records in Nov. 2015; Refai issued an opinion of negligence in Sept. 2016.
Plaintiffs filed suit Oct. 19, 2016 (Puerto Rico law, one-year malpractice SOL); jury in Mar. 2019 found the suit timely and awarded damages.
District court granted Defendants’ Rule 50 JMOL, set aside the jury verdict, and dismissed as time-barred; Plaintiffs appealed. First Circuit reversed, holding a reasonable jury could find the claim timely and that JMOL was improper.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
When does the one-year malpractice SOL begin to run (actual vs constructive knowledge)?	Accrual occurred no earlier than Nov. 2015 (request that Refai review records) or Sept. 2016 (Refai report); focusing on rehabilitation before investigating was reasonable.	Plaintiffs had facts sufficient to sue by March/June/Aug 2014 (post-op pain, decision to seek care in Georgia, receipt of records) and thus the SOL ran before filing.	A reasonable jury could find Plaintiffs lacked requisite knowledge before Oct. 19, 2015; accrual was not necessarily earlier.
Did Plaintiffs exercise reasonable diligence to trigger constructive knowledge?	Plaintiffs sought continued treatment from other physicians, had regular follow‑ups with Refai, and reasonably relied on surgical risk warnings and initial treatment focus.	Plaintiffs waited ~15 months after receiving records and did not promptly investigate; that inaction shows lack of diligence.	Diligence is a jury question; a reasonable jury could conclude Plaintiffs were reasonably diligent and lacked constructive knowledge.
Was the district court’s grant of JMOL and dismissal for being time‑barred proper?	JMOL was improper because reasonable jurors could differ on knowledge/diligence; evidence supported the jury verdict.	JMOL proper because the evidence compels a single conclusion that the claim was untimely.	Reversed: JMOL was improper; verdict reinstated and case remanded for further proceedings.

Villarini-Garcia v. Hosp. Del Maestro, Inc., 8 F.3d 81 (1st Cir. 1993) (one‑year malpractice accrual when plaintiff has or with due diligence would have information sufficient to permit suit)
Espada v. Lugo, 312 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002) (distinguishes expected surgical side effects from actionable tort; reliance on physician reassurances may delay accrual)
Rodriguez-Suris v. Montesinos, 123 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 1997) (constructive knowledge and tolling where plaintiff reasonably relies on tortfeasor’s representations)
Galarza v. Zagury, 739 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1984) (plaintiff must know more than mere ill effects; must know injury could be tortious)
Aldahonda-Rivera v. Parke Davis & Co., 882 F.2d 590 (1st Cir. 1989) (ignorance caused solely by failure to consult an attorney does not toll the statute)
Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1990) (accrual requires knowledge of the facts giving rise to the claim, not their full legal implications)