Meisels v. Meisels, 1:19-cv-04767

Background

Plaintiff Minia Meisels (a British citizen) sued her son and grandson (Henry and Joel Meisels) seeking appointment of a receiver and other interim relief over five Brooklyn residential properties allegedly owned by her and her late husband, Rabbi Yehoshua Zev Vilmos Meisels.
Minia alleges Henry and Joel diverted rents, refused accountings, stopped longstanding monthly payments to Minia and to her other son Jacob, and denied her access to records and an apartment.
Defendants rely on a 2017 Hebrew "Sale Agreement" signed by Vilmos that purports to transfer his interests in four properties to Henry and Jacob (gifting a fifth), and assert the transfer was valid and reflected Vilmos’ intent.
Minia counters that Vilmos disavowed that Sale Agreement in 2018, that he lacked capacity when he signed it, and that his 2018 will leaves everything to Minia; the will and probate issues are pending in Israel.
Minia moved under Rules 65 and 66 for a temporary receiver (or, alternatively, an independent manager/accountings and injunction against dissipation); Jacob cross-moved for interim monthly payments of $10,000 he claims he historically received.
The Magistrate Judge recommended denying both Minia’s motion for a receiver and Jacob’s interim relief request, concluding the record is undeveloped and the extraordinary relief is not justified.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a receiver/preliminary injunction should be appointed to protect the Properties and income	Minia: she is the legal owner; Henry/Joel are diverting rents and withholding records; urgent receivership needed to preserve assets and ensure distributions	Henry/Joel: ownership is disputed; Sale Agreement transferred interests; no evidence of imminent dissipation or emergency; ordinary legal remedies and discovery suffice	Denied. Movant failed to show by clear and convincing evidence ownership, imminent danger, or irreparable harm; record too undeveloped to decide ultimate ownership
Validity/ownership of the Properties (effect of 2017 Sale Agreement and 2018 will)	Minia: Vilmos and she were the historic owners; Sale Agreement is invalid (Vilmos lacked capacity) and Vilmos’ will leaves estate to Minia	Henry/JoeI: Sale Agreement (and related transfer documents) reflect a transfer/understanding giving Henry (and Jacob) interests; some witnesses attest to Vilmos’ understanding when signing	Not decided. Court declined to resolve ownership on preliminary record; factual disputes require discovery and evidentiary findings
Irreparable harm and entitlement to interim cash payments (Jacob’s request)	Minia/Jacob: cessation of long‑standing monthly payments causes dire financial hardship; money is needed now	Defs: monetary loss alone is insufficient absent imminent insolvency; Jacob has salary/other support and cannot document receipts; no proof of imminent destitution	Denied. Monetary injury alone is insufficient; movants did not show likely and imminent insolvency or irreparable harm
Alternative interim remedies (independent manager, monthly accountings, injunction against dissipation)	Minia: less intrusive remedies (property manager, accountings, injunction) would protect income pending merits	Defs: management has been stable for years; no evidence of mismanagement, disposal, or changed condition warranting such orders	Denied. No legal or factual basis shown for interim management or injunction; discovery is appropriate first step

Key Cases Cited

Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010) (preliminary injunction standard: likelihood of success or serious questions, irreparable harm, balance of hardships, public interest)
Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (U.S. 1997) (preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy and burden of persuasion rests on movant)
Faiveley Transp. Malmo AB v. Wabtec Corp., 559 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2009) (irreparable harm requirement for preliminary injunction)
Rosen v. Siegel, 106 F.3d 28 (2d Cir. 1997) (appointment of a receiver is extraordinary and should be used cautiously)
Netsphere, Inc. v. Baron, 703 F.3d 296 (5th Cir. 2012) (receivership is an extraordinary remedy justified only on clear necessity)
U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Nesbitt Bellevue Prop., LLC, 859 F. Supp. 2d 602 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (factors for receivership include fraud, imminent danger to property, inadequacy of legal remedies, relative harms)
Moore v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 409 F.3d 506 (2d Cir. 2005) (where adequate remedy at law exists, injunctions are generally unavailable)
Grand River Enter. Six Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor, 481 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2007) (irreparable harm must be actual and imminent)
Brenntag Int’l Chems., Inc. v. Bank of India, 175 F.3d 245 (2d Cir. 1999) (monetary injury generally does not constitute irreparable harm)