Mehan v. City of Stamford
127 Conn. App. 619
Conn. App. Ct.2011Background
- Edward Mehan, a Stamford firefighter since 1959, suffered chest pains on February 10, 2001 during a fire; tests showed no myocardial infarction but revealed preexisting coronary artery disease.
- Mehan reported the incident to his supervisor; on April 9, 2001 he partially completed form 30C, with Brown completing the injury section and signing as representative; the form was not delivered to the employer's HR department.
- Mehan was later found unfit for active duty (October 2002), underwent stent procedures in 2003, and retired in late 2003; treating physician Labarre later described the 2001 injury as an acute coronary syndrome likely precipitated by firefighting effort.
- Mehan filed a workers’ compensation claim; a 2006 hearing addressed subject matter jurisdiction; the commissioner found jurisdiction in 2007, and proceedings resumed in 2008 after related developments in Harpaz v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc.
- In October 2008 the commissioner granted preclusion, then sua sponte vacated it and ultimately again precluded, determining the 2001 acute coronary syndrome was a compensable work-related injury aggravating preexisting disease, with a 25% permanent partial disability to the heart.
- The City appealed; the board affirmed; issues included (1) sufficiency of Form 30C to trigger Form 43, (2) denial of reconsideration, and (3) whether the injury was compensable.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was Form 30C sufficient to trigger Form 43? | Mehan's notice to Brown sufficed; Brown had authority to act for the city; timely notice triggered liability contest. | Form 30C lacked required details about the injury, so it did not trigger Form 43. | Yes; Form 30C as completed by Brown was sufficient to trigger Form 43. |
| Does Donahue/Harpaz violate due process by preclusion and limit employer's defense after preclusion? | Donahue/Harpaz permit preclusion with limited employer role; decisions align with due process. | Conclusive presumption under § 31-294c(b) unlawfully deprives due process by extinguishing some defenses. | No; Supreme Court precedents control; the conclusive presumption and preclusion framework are constitutional as applied. |
| Was the February 10, 2001 acute coronary syndrome a compensable work-related injury causing a significant aggravation of preexisting disease? | Evidence, including Labarre's testimony, shows ASC significantly contributed to CAD and disability. | The medical testimony does not prove a substantial factor in aggravating CAD. | Yes; the evidence supports that ASC was a substantial contributing factor and permanent disability. |
Key Cases Cited
- Pereira v. State, 228 Conn. 535 (1994) (remedial construction of §31-294c; liberal notice requirements)
- Tardy v. Abington Constructors, Inc., 71 Conn.App. 140 (2002) (notice sufficiency; triggers employer's liability contest)
- Pernacchio v. New Haven, 63 Conn. App. 570 (2001) (notice adequacy and employer liability timing)
- Harpaz v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 286 Conn. 102 (2008) (scope of preclusion; due process protections)
- Donahue v. Veridiem, Inc., 291 Conn. 537 (2009) (employer role after preclusion; limits on contesting evidence)
- McDonough v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 204 Conn. 104 (1987) (causation standard: substantial factor and reasonable medical probability)