Megatel C90-2, Inc., Armin Afzalipour, and Megatel Homes, LLC F/K/A Megatel Homes, Inc. v. Bank of Utah, 24-0206

Petitioners (Megatel C90-2, Inc., et al.) sought review in the Texas Supreme Court after an adverse appellate ruling in their dispute with Bank of Utah.
Before the Supreme Court could decide the case, the parties reached a settlement and jointly moved to vacate the opinion of the lower appellate court.
The same type of request to vacate settled, already-decided appellate opinions appeared in three unrelated cases, prompting concern about the frequency of such requests.
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 56.3 governs whether appellate opinions should be vacated following settlement, creating a presumption against vacatur unless exceptional circumstances exist.
The Supreme Court examined the parties’ arguments and briefing, solicited supplemental submissions, and explicitly considered whether to vacate the court of appeals’ opinion in light of the recent trend and underlying public policy concerns.
The Court emphasized the public interest in preserving judicial opinions and the potential for abuse if judgments could routinely be vacated after settlement.

Issue	Megatel's Argument	Bank of Utah's Argument	Held
Should the court of appeals' opinion be vacated after settlement?	Settlement justifies vacatur to implement the parties' agreement and remove precedent adverse to them.	All parties jointly favor vacatur as part of their settlement.	No; motions to vacate appellate opinions post-settlement are denied absent exceptional circumstances.
Does Rule 56.3 permit automatic vacatur upon settlement?	Parties argue that joint agreement suffices for vacatur under the rule.	Bank concurs; motion was jointly filed.	No; Rule 56.3 gives the Supreme Court discretion and does not require vacatur unless specifically ordered.
Should private settlements dictate removal of publicly issued opinions?	Arguments imply that private agreements outweigh public interest in precedent.	Same as above.	No; public interest in judicial precedent outweighs the preferences of settling parties.
Are there exceptional circumstances warranting vacatur in this case?	Implicitly assert fairness to parties as exceptional.	No specific exceptional circumstances cited.	No exceptional circumstances found; vacatur denied.

U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18 (U.S. Supreme Court limits vacatur after settlement to exceptional cases)
United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (Mootness and vacatur doctrine in federal appellate courts)
Houston Cable TV, Inc. v. Inwood W. Civic Ass’n, 860 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. ends routine vacatur of appellate opinions after settlement)
Morath v. Lewis, 601 S.W.3d 785 (Tex. adopts presumption against vacatur when cases become moot by settlement)