108 F.4th 1005
7th Cir.2024Background
- Megan Passarella (nurse) and Sandra Dottenwhy (pharmacy technician) worked for Aspirus Health in Wisconsin.
- Aspirus implemented a COVID-19 vaccination mandate in November 2021, with an option to seek individual religious exemptions.
- Passarella and Dottenwhy requested exemptions, linking their objections in part to Christian beliefs about the body as a temple and in part to vaccine safety concerns.
- Aspirus denied their requests, determining their primary objections were non-religious (safety/medical judgment) and terminated their employment in December 2021.
- The plaintiffs sued under Title VII for failure to accommodate their religion. The district court dismissed their claims at the pleading stage, concluding the objections were not religiously grounded.
- The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding plaintiffs alleged a plausible religious basis sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether requests for exemption from a COVID-19 vaccine mandate, partially invoking religion but also referencing safety, constitute a "religious" objection under Title VII | Passarella/Dottenwhy argued their objections, rooted in Christian beliefs about the body and prayer, suffice under Title VII even if mixed with secular concerns | Aspirus argued their objections were fundamentally based on secular safety concerns, not religious prohibition, thus not protected under Title VII | The Court held that if a request is plausibly based at least in part on religion, it counts as religious at the pleading stage, even if mixed with secular concerns |
| The adequacy of pleadings for religious accommodation claims under Title VII | Plaintiffs claimed their objections, as articulated, satisfy federal pleading standards: plausible religious motivation is enough | Aspirus said plaintiffs had to show their beliefs specifically and directly barred vaccination, not merely invoke religious language generally | The Court held the pleadings were sufficient; detailed orthodoxy or exclusivity to religion is not required |
| Whether courts should scrutinize the sincerity or primary motivation in mixed religious/secular exemption requests at the pleadings stage | Plaintiffs said sincerity and motivation are merits issues, not for resolution at the motion-to-dismiss stage | Aspirus claimed mixed motives or primarily secular reasoning bars claim from proceeding | The Court held that courts are not to scrutinize at this stage; plausible religious dimension is enough to survive dismissal |
| The legal standard for defining a "religious" objection under Title VII | Plaintiffs argued that a blend of religious and secular motivations is protected under Title VII’s broad definition | Aspirus argued only exclusively religious objections are protected | The Court adopted a broad standard: objections plausibly based in part on religious belief or practice are protected |
Key Cases Cited
- Thomas v. Review Board of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (courts must not dissect or judge the orthodoxy of religious beliefs)
- Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (courts avoid evaluating the reasonableness of religious beliefs under RFRA)
- Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp. Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (Free Exercise protection is not limited by orthodoxy or official dogma)
- United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (beliefs may be incomprehensible to others, but courts should not judge the truth of religious experiences)
- Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (an objection can be religious even if based in part on secular reasons)
- United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (defines a religious belief for conscientious objector status, excluding merely personal codes not related to a Supreme Being)
- Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897 (Title VII protects religiously motivated conduct broadly, not limited to tenets or mandates)