Meemic Insurance Company v. Randal Ritchie, 358929

Background:

Randal S. Ritchie (insured) allegedly pointed a loaded handgun at Beverly Weathersby (a social worker) at close range during a driveway encounter; Weathersby sued for assault and negligence seeking emotional-distress damages.
Ritchie denied pointing the gun (admitted carrying it) and testified he kept it pointed toward the ground; he also admitted that if he had pointed it, it would have been intentional.
Meemic Insurance brought a declaratory action and moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), seeking a ruling that it had no duty to defend or indemnify under Ritchie’s homeowner policy.
The policy covers damages caused by an "occurrence" defined as an "accident," and contains an exclusion barring coverage for acts intended or that could reasonably be expected to cause bodily or personal injury (and excludes punitive damages).
The trial court granted Meemic’s motion, holding Ritchie’s conduct was not an "occurrence" (accident) and, alternatively, that the intentional-act exclusion barred coverage; the decision was affirmed on appeal.

Issues:

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Meemic)	Defendant's Argument (Weathersby)	Held
Whether Ritchie’s conduct was an "occurrence" (an "accident") under the policy	The pointing/confrontation was intentional and created a direct risk of harm, so it was not an "accident" and no "occurrence" occurred	The injury-causing conduct could be viewed as accidental/covered or at least arguably covered, so Meemic must defend	Court held the act was not an "occurrence": the alleged intentional pointing reasonably should have produced fear, so no coverage
Whether the intentional-act exclusion bars coverage even if an "occurrence" were found	The exclusion applies because a reasonable person in Ritchie’s position should have expected emotional injury from pointing a gun at an unarmed stranger	The complaint pleads negligence as an alternative theory that could trigger coverage	Court held exclusion would apply; injury was the reasonably expected result of the intentional act
Whether pleading negligence triggers a duty to defend	Meemic: substance controls; the complaint’s basis is intentional conduct, so no theory arguably falls within coverage	Weathersby: negligence allegation could require a defense because insurer must defend any theory that arguably falls within coverage	Court held the duty to defend is determined by the substance of the injury-causing act; here allegations arise from intentional conduct so no defense obligation
Effect of accepting Ritchie’s version (he did not point the gun) on coverage	Meemic: even if Ritchie’s account is credited, either no proximate cause for negligence or still no covered occurrence	Weathersby: acceptance of Ritchie’s version could transform claim into nonintentional conduct, arguably creating coverage	Court held that under Ritchie’s version the negligence claim would likely fail for lack of proximate cause; under Weathersby’s version it was intentional and excluded — in either scenario no coverage

Key Cases Cited

El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 504 Mich 152 (standard of review for summary disposition under MCR 2.116)
Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Masters, 460 Mich 105 (framework for when intentional acts can still qualify as an "accident")
Allstate Ins. Co. v. McCarn, 466 Mich 277 (analysis that "accident" is evaluated from the insured’s standpoint)
Nabozny v. Burkhardt, 461 Mich 471 (intentional act that reasonably should have caused the injury is not an accident)
Auto Club Group Ins. Co. v. Burchell, 249 Mich App 468 (duty to defend depends on substance of injury-causing act, not labels in pleadings)
Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Harrington, 455 Mich 377 (insurance-policy interpretation principles)