Medina-Gonzalez, Marco Polo
PD-1661-14
| Tex. App. | Jan 22, 2015Background
- Marco Polo Medina-Gonzalez was indicted for aggravated kidnapping (Ct. 1), aggravated robbery (Ct. 2), and evading arrest with a motor vehicle (Ct. 3). After a jury trial, Medina pleaded guilty to Count 3; the jury found him guilty on Counts 1 and 2 and assessed sentences of 80 years on Counts 1 and 2 and 10 years on Count 3.
- On appeal to the Tenth Court of Appeals, Medina raised a single issue arguing the trial court charged the jury incorrectly by instructing on both primary-actor liability and party liability when the evidence only supported party liability. The Tenth Court overruled the issue and affirmed the convictions.
- Medina filed a petition for discretionary review in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals challenging the intermediate court’s conclusion that the jury charge correctly allowed conviction as either a principal actor or as a party.
- The factual dispute centers on whether Medina was an active participant in the crimes (one of the masked actors who entered the store and confronted the victim) or whether he acted only as the getaway driver and thus could be convicted only under the law of parties. Defense points to police video and officer testimony placing Medina in the getaway vehicle, not among masked actors.
- The State (and the intermediate court) relied on some testimony suggesting a victim thought a particular assailant was Medina and on circumstantial facts (Medina’s prior position at the store and numbers in his wallet) to support an inference he might have been a primary actor; Medina contends those inferences are unfounded and contravened by stronger physical evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the jury charge improperly instructed on both principal-actor and party liability when evidence supported only party liability | Medina: The evidence shows he was the getaway driver, not an actor who entered the store; under Jaycon the jury should not have been allowed to consider principal-actor liability | State: There was some evidence and reasonable inference that Medina acted as a principal (victim’s identification, knowledge of store layout, numbers in wallet) supporting both theories | The Tenth Court of Appeals held the application paragraph correctly allowed conviction as either a principal actor or as a party and affirmed the convictions; Medina seeks further review by the Court of Criminal Appeals |
Key Cases Cited
- Jaycon v. State, 651 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (discusses when the law of parties must be tailored to the facts and when charging principal liability is inappropriate)
- Apodaca v. State, 589 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (addresses principles on distinguishing principal and party liability)
- Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (jury verdict must rest on evidence admitted and reasonable inferences therefrom)