Meagan Garland v. Jeffrey Ruhl, State of Missouri, Department of Social Services, Family Support Division
2015 Mo. LEXIS 13
Mo.2015Background
- Mother (Meagan Garland) sought judicial review of an administrative child support order issued by the Family Support Division (FSD) after an FSD hearing officer set Father’s support at $357/month.
- Before judicial review was resolved, Mother and Father stipulated to a more favorable judgment ($500/month support, different insurance obligations) and asked the trial court to enter judgment prospectively; no arrearages were imposed.
- The trial court entered the stipulated judgment, dismissed Mother’s petition for judicial review as moot, and Mother then sought attorney fees from FSD under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 536.087 (claiming FSD’s position was not substantially justified).
- The trial court dismissed the fee application, holding Mother did not “prevail” against FSD because the administrative order became moot due to the parties’ settlement and FSD had not been an adversarial party in the agency proceeding.
- The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning § 536.087 applies only when a state agency is an adversarial party in the agency proceeding, the agency took a “position” (not merely acted as adjudicator), and the private party prevailed against that agency position.
Issues
| Issue | Garland's Argument | FSD's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 536.087 authorizes fee awards against FSD here | FSD was a party to the judicial-review action arising from the agency proceeding and should pay fees because Garland prevailed by obtaining a more favorable judgment | § 536.087 applies only when the state is an adversarial party in the agency proceeding; here FSD was the adjudicator, not a party | Fee award denied: § 536.087 does not apply because FSD was not an adversarial party in the agency proceeding |
| Whether an administrative adjudicator’s order constitutes a “position” under § 536.087 | The administrative order was an agency “position” that lacked substantial justification | An adjudicative decision is not a litigating “position” asserted by the agency; the statute targets positions taken by agencies as parties | Denied: an adjudicator’s decision is not a “position” for § 536.087 purposes |
| Whether Garland “prevailed” against FSD under § 536.087 | Obtaining the more favorable stipulated judgment on judicial review counts as prevailing against FSD | The settlement was between Garland and Father and did not alter FSD’s legal interests; Garland did not obtain a favorable dismissal or judgment against FSD | Denied: Garland did not prevail against FSD because the settlement addressed only parties’ rights, not FSD’s position |
| Whether the state’s burden to show substantial justification was reached | Garland argued FSD’s position was not substantially justified and thus the presumption against fees should not apply | FSD contended threshold elements (agency as party, position, prevailing) were not met, so burden-shift never arose | Denied: threshold elements were not met, so state’s substantial-justification burden was not reached |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Reed, 181 S.W.3d 567 (Mo. banc) (parental support obligation arises from common law)
- Berry v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., 397 S.W.3d 425 (Mo. banc) (American Rule: fee awards require statutory or contractual authorization)
- Richardson v. State Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 863 S.W.2d 876 (Mo. banc) (sovereign immunity and strict construction of waivers)
- Greenbriar Hills Country Club v. Dir. of Revenue, 47 S.W.3d 346 (Mo. banc) (purpose of § 536.087: hold agencies accountable for unjustified positions)
- In re Stephen C. Perry, 882 F.2d 534 (1st Cir.) (administrative adjudicators acting as adjudicators cannot be liable for fees under analogous fee statute)
- Geriatric Nursing Facility, Inc. v. Dept. of Soc. Svcs., 693 S.W.2d 206 (Mo. Ct. App.) (administrative hearing officers function as adjudicators and are not parties in judicial review)