Meade v. Pinkerman (In re Alwood), 531 B.R. 182

MEI established in 1996 to hold assets and for tax/security purposes; Barbara Meade was MEI’s key officer and MEI did business as Ultimate Floors by Rhino starting 2010.
Defendant presented as a business owner and managing partner of JennDa LLC and other entities, but concealed past convictions and roles in multiple entities.
MEI and Defendant engaged in a series of transactions: a Board/Stock issuance that diluted Meade’s shares and allocated 1/3 to Andrew Meade, resulting in control shifts.
An Agreement for Purchase and Sale of Business transferred Ultimate Floors by Rhino to Triple D Solutions, LLC; Meade did not sign this agreement and was unaware of its existence.
Defendant allegedly used MEI’s assets and Rhino Linings trademark without proper transfer or consent, proceeded with related purchases, and incurred substantial unpaid balances.
Plaintiff seeks nondischargeability under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (actual fraud) and § 523(a)(4) (larceny/embezzlement) based on these events.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Defendant’s acts constitute actual fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A).	Meade argues Defendant schemed to deprive him by fraudulently seizing control of MEI and Ultimate Floors.	Defendant would argue lack of proof of intentional fraud or misrepresentation.	Yes; actual fraud established under § 523(a)(2)(A).
Whether a debt arises from larceny/embezzlement under § 523(a)(4).	Meade contends Defendant improperly used Rhino Linings trademark and assets, converting them for his own use.	Defendant argues no fiduciary relationship existed and embezzlement not proven; possibly argues for other theory.	Yes for larceny; debt arising from improper use of Rhino Linings assets is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(4).

Rembert v. AT & T Universal Card Servs. (In re Rembert), 141 F.3d 277 (6th Cir.1998) (strict construction of discharge exceptions in creditors’ favor)
In re Livingston, 372 Fed.Appx. 613 (6th Cir.2010) (credibility and evidentiary standards in dischargeability cases)
McClellan v. Cantrell, 217 F.3d 890 (7th Cir.2000) (actual fraud broader than misrepresentation; includes schemes to deprive/cheat)
In re Vitanovich, 259 B.R. 873 (6th Cir. BAP 2001) (actual fraud via scheme to deprive or cheat; totality of circumstances)
In re Cole, 164 B.R. 951 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (definition of actual fraud includes purposeful deception)
In re Szczepanski, 139 B.R. 842 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1991) (subjective standard for fraudulent intent; totality of circumstances)
In re Blaszak, 397 F.3d 386 (6th Cir.2005) (fiduciary capacity requirement for § 523(a)(4) defalcation analysis)
In re Bucci, 493 F.3d 635 (6th Cir.2007) (fiduciary-defalcation framework across cases)
In re Sinchak, 109 B.R. 273 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990) (embezzlement scope without fiduciary capacity)
Brady v. McAllister (In re Brady), 101 F.3d 1165 (6th Cir.1996) (emphasizes fraudulent appropriation as embezzlement)
Monsanto Co. v. Trantham (In re Trantham), 304 B.R. 298 (6th Cir. BAP 2004) (intangible property included in larceny/defalcation discussions)