Mead v. Beaufort County Assessor, 419 S.C. 125

Background

Frank Mead, born 1939, owned a home on Hilton Head Island since 1976 and qualified for the South Carolina homestead exemption from 2005–2010.
In 2011 Mead rented his home for at least 138 days and lived elsewhere (paid rent for an apartment); the Beaufort County Assessor revoked his 2011 homestead exemption citing a >14-day rental rule.
Mead appealed to the Beaufort County Tax Equalization Board (denied) and then to the Administrative Law Court (ALC); both parties filed cross motions for summary judgment focused on whether Chapter 43’s 4% owner-occupied assessment requirements apply to the Chapter 37 homestead exemption.
The ALC granted Mead summary judgment, holding Chapter 37 (homestead statute) controls and the Chapter 43 >14-day rental limitation does not apply to the homestead exemption; it characterized the homestead exemption and primary-residence classification as distinct.
The Assessor appealed; the appellate court affirmed the ALC as to 2011 but modified the ALC’s blanket ruling for subsequent years, holding future eligibility depends on no change in Mead’s circumstances.

Issues

Issue	Mead's Argument	Assessor's Argument	Held
Whether homestead exemption eligibility is governed solely by Chapter 37 or also requires meeting Chapter 43 (4% owner-occupied) requirements	Homestead eligibility is set by Chapter 37; Mead met its requirements and thus qualifies	Chapter 43’s owner-occupied requirements (including the 4% assessment and domicile rules) also must be satisfied for homestead exemption	Court: Chapter 37 controls homestead eligibility; Chapter 43 requirements are not prerequisites to the Chapter 37 homestead exemption (affirmed)
Whether the Chapter 43 “14-day rental” rule (IRC §280A(g) derivative) disqualifies Mead for the homestead exemption after renting >14 days in 2011	The 14-day rule does not apply to the Chapter 37 homestead exemption	Renting >14 days triggers loss of the 4% owner-occupied ratio and should bar homestead relief	Court: 14-day rule derives from §12-43-220(c) and does not apply to Chapter 37 homestead exemption; ALC correctly refused to apply it (affirmed)
Whether §12-43-220(c)(2)(i) is more than a proration provision and affects homestead qualification	Mead: the clause is a proration rule (treats part-year qualification as whole-year for §12-43-220 purposes) and does not impose additional homestead conditions	Assessor: the provision serves broader purpose and supports linking Chapters 37 and 43	Court: treated §12-43-220(c)(2)(i) as a proration provision and held it does not control Chapter 37 homestead eligibility (affirmed)
Whether the ALC’s ruling should determine Mead’s eligibility for years after 2011	Mead sought continuing relief for subsequent years	Assessor argued the ALC should not grant multi-year relief absent challenges for those years	Court: ALC exceeded the record in ruling for subsequent years; modified ruling to make future eligibility contingent on unchanged circumstances (modified)

Key Cases Cited

Media Gen. Commc’ns, Inc. v. S.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 388 S.C. 138, 694 S.E.2d 525 (ALC summary-judgment procedure guidance)
Alltel Commc’ns, Inc. v. S.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 399 S.C. 313, 731 S.E.2d 869 (statutory interpretation and cross-motions for summary judgment)
Ford v. Beaufort Cty. Assessor, 398 S.C. 508, 730 S.E.2d 335 (application of the >14-day rental rule under §12-43-220(c))
Centex Int’l, Inc. v. S.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 406 S.C. 132, 750 S.E.2d 65 (strict construction of tax exemptions)
CFRE, LLC v. Greenville Cty. Assessor, 395 S.C. 67, 716 S.E.2d 877 (statutory construction principles and reading statutes as a whole)
George v. Fabri, 345 S.C. 440, 548 S.E.2d 868 (summary judgment standard)
David v. McLeod Reg’l Med. Ctr., 367 S.C. 242, 626 S.E.2d 1 (summary judgment procedural limits)
Cooper River Bridge, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm’n, 182 S.C. 72, 188 S.E. 508 (rule that tax statutes doubtful in application favor the taxpayer)