McQuiggin v. Perkins
133 S. Ct. 1924
| SCOTUS | 2013Background
- Perkins was convicted of first-degree murder in Michigan in 1993; his conviction became final in 1997.
- He filed a federal habeas petition in 2008, more than 11 years after final judgment, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel and newly discovered evidence supporting actual innocence.
- Perkins relied on three affidavits to claim Jones, not Perkins, committed Henderson’s murder.
- AEDPA restricts federal habeas petitions to one year after final judgment, with a discovery rule for new evidence (§2244(d)(1)(D)).
- The district court ruled the affidavits were insufficient and untimely; the Sixth Circuit reversed, allowing the actual-innocence gateway to bypass the time bar.
- The Supreme Court vacated the Sixth Circuit and remanded to address whether delay can be considered in evaluating a credible actual-innocence claim and to apply Schlup’s standard correctly.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether actual innocence can overcome AEDPA’s time bar | Perkins argues actual-innocence gateway should bypass §2244(d)(1) | State argues no exception to the statute; no override of timing | Yes, actual innocence can overcome the time bar, but only when the showing is reliable and convincing. |
| Whether delay in presenting new evidence should affect the actual-innocence gateway | Delay should not bar consideration if innocence is shown | Delay undermines reliability and credibility of new evidence | Delay is a factor in evaluating actual-innocence, not an automatic bar. |
| Whether Schlup’s standard governs the gateway inquiry in untimely petitions | Gateway claims should be evaluated under Schlup’s demanding standard | Court should treat the delay and statutes as controlling without a new standard | Schlup’s standard governs; petitioner must show it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him. |
| Whether equitable tolling or diligence is required to invoke the gateway | Diligence should not bar a properly supported actual-innocence claim | Diligence is required to ensure reliability and prevent abuse | Delay can be weighed in assessing the evidence, but no strict diligence threshold applies to the gateway. |
| What is the proper disposition given the district court’s threshold assessment | If evidence is credible, merits review should proceed | Untimely petition with inadequate showing should be dismissed | Remand for further proceedings consistent with the opinion; the Sixth Circuit’s ruling is not final. |
Key Cases Cited
- Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995) (actual innocence as gateway to avoid procedural bars)
- House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006) (actual innocence as gateway to merits review; timing matters)
- Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 (1998) (miscarriage of justice exception applied to recall mandate under AEDPA)
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (procedural-default framework; miscarriage of justice exception recognizes inherent fairness concerns)
- Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992) (excusing failure to develop state-court record when miscarriage of justice would result)
- McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (abuse of the writ; miscarriages of justice context)
- Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998) (actual innocence as gateway to collateral review in certain contexts)
- Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. _ (2010) (equitable tolling of AEDPA limitations)