11 F. Supp. 3d 789
S.D. Tex.2014Background
- Plaintiffs (McPeters and Barclay) sued LexisNexis over mandatory e-filing/e-serving fees in Montgomery and Jefferson Counties, alleging statutory, antitrust (Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 15.05), DTPA/unconscionability, and state constitutional claims.
- This case follows an earlier related suit (McPeters I) that raised similar concerns about county adoption and fee approval; federal claims there were dismissed and the Court noted statutory process concerns.
- Plaintiffs amended their complaint multiple times; the TFEAA (Section 15.05) claims survived an earlier motion to dismiss but the court revisited that ruling on supplemental briefing.
- LexisNexis argued (inter alia) judicial immunity, lack of antitrust standing, that fees were market-based and accompanied different product features, and that mootness/voluntary cessation and failure-to-show denial-of-access defeat constitutional claims.
- The Court reexamined the pleadings and summary-judgment record, held a certification hearing, and ordered supplemental briefing before issuing the decision below.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Judicial/immunity | LexisNexis performed court-ordered services and should share derived judicial immunity. | Derived judicial immunity does not extend to private service providers who do not exercise judge-like discretionary judgments. | Denied — LexisNexis not cloaked with derived judicial immunity. |
| TFEAA (Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 15.05) — standing/ liability | LexisNexis’s fees were illegal per se or an unreasonable restraint; statutory defects and lack of approval show anticompetitive conduct. | TFEAA claims require antitrust standing; pleaded statutory violations target counties/clerks/judges, not LexisNexis, so plaintiffs lack antitrust standing. | Granted dismissal (judgment on pleadings) — plaintiffs lack antitrust standing because alleged statutory violations implicate governmental actors, not LexisNexis. |
| Class certification — DTPA/unconscionability | Fees are the common issue; unconscionability depends on Defendant’s conduct, so a class can be certified under Rule 23(b)(3). | Unconscionability requires highly individualized inquiries into consumer knowledge, sophistication, causation, and damages. | Denied — predominance not met; individualized issues would predominate. |
| Summary judgment on remaining claims (DTPA unconscionability; Open Courts/Right to Petition; state constitutional monopoly claim) | Plaintiffs contend fees were excessive, mandatory, effectively a tax/condition on access, and caused harm. | LexisNexis: prices were comparable across providers and locales, features differ, plaintiffs cannot show they would have chosen a cheaper alternative; no showing they were prevented or delayed from filing. | Granted for LexisNexis — summary judgment: unconscionability fails (no evidence plaintiffs would have chosen alternatives or were taken advantage of); constitutional claims fail for lack of showing of prevention/delay and because alleged statutory noncompliance implicates counties. |
Key Cases Cited
- Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429 (U.S. 1993) (derived judicial immunity limited to officials performing judge-like discretionary functions)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (plausibility standard for pleadings)
- Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (U.S. 1977) (antitrust standing/antitrust injury principles)
- Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, Tex., 614 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 2010) (district court may reconsider its prior rulings)
- McCormack v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988) (antitrust standing analysis and proper plaintiff factors)
- Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (U.S. 2011) (class certification Rule 23 commonality/predominance guidance)
- Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (U.S. 2013) (predominance requirement under Rule 23(b)(3))
- LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. 1986) (Texas open courts doctrine and filing-fee analysis)
- Abbott Labs., Inc. (Ross Labs. Div.) v. Segura, 907 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1995) (state antitrust statute construed in harmony with federal interpretations)