McNeal v. Adams
2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 21995
9th Cir.2010Background
- McNeal molested a 14-year-old; DNA from victim linked to him; prosecution moved to compel a DNA sample.
- Public defender appointed; hearing set for August 10–11, 2000; notice to defense counsel failed.
- Defense counsel did not appear at the August hearings; the court granted the motion to compel DNA sample.
- DNA sample collected August 16, 2000; DNA matched evidence from the victim; trial admissibility hearing held.
- Petitioner was convicted of multiple offenses; direct appeal claimed ineffective assistance for counsel’s absence at the hearing.
- California courts held the hearing was not a critical stage; Petitioner sought federal habeas relief under AEDPA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is the DNA-motion hearing a Cronic critical stage | McNeal argues absence of counsel mandates per se reversal. | Advises no automatic reversal; not a Cronic critical stage. | Not a Cronic critical stage; no per se reversal. |
| Was the claim exhausted | State courts addressed the critical-stage issue on direct appeal and habeas review. | Exhaustion satisfied because state-court decisions addressed the claim. | Exhaustion satisfied; ripe for review. |
| Under AEDPA, was the state court decision reasonable | State court misapplied federal law and reached the wrong result. | Decision not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established law. | Not contrary or unreasonable; AEDPA standard met. |
| Did the hearing qualify as a Cronic stage under the Ninth Circuit test | Hearing had significant consequences, hence a Cronic stage. | No, it did not significantly affect the proceedings; counsel not necessary. | Not a Cronic stage under the three-factor test. |
Key Cases Cited
- Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (right to counsel at stages may affect substantial rights)
- United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) (per se prejudice when counsel entirely absent at a critical stage)
- King v. Superior Court, 107 Cal.App.4th 929 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (distinguishable; pretrial hearing not automatically critical stage)
- Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411 (2009) (AEDPA standards; states decisions not contrary to Supreme Court precedent)
- United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (handwriting samples and evidence collection not critical stage)
- Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (early identification procedures not automatically critical stage)
- United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973) (post-indictment procedures not inherently critical stage)
- Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2006) (three-factor test for Cronic critical stage)
- United States v. Benford, 574 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussion of Cronic critical stages in Ninth Circuit)
- United States v. Lewis, 483 F.3d 871 (8th Cir. 2007) (hands-on example of non-critical DNA-related procedures)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (prejudice standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 119 (2008) (AEDPA deference framework for state court decisions)
- Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 830 (9th Cir. 2009) (distinction between different stages for prejudice inquiry)
- Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971) (exhaustion requirement purpose and review)