McNamara v. The City of Long Beach
2:16-cv-01205
E.D.N.YApr 21, 2017Background
- McNamara, a paid Long Beach firefighter and secretary of the local firefighters' union (LBPFA), published union-related material and created a website criticizing aspects of the volunteer fire department (LBVFD).
- After videotaping an LBVFD response and publishing materials, McNamara was initially excluded from, then later invited to, an official Awards Dinner where he received an award; shortly after, he was assaulted by LBVFD members at the event and later at an after-party at Station 2, where he wore a digital recorder.
- McNamara reported the assaults; a volunteer filed a Workplace Violence complaint against him; municipal officials (including Kemins and Schnirman) subsequently brought multiple disciplinary charges, suspended him, and later terminated him following a hearing presided over by Schnirman.
- McNamara sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging First Amendment retaliation for his protected speech and union activities; defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
- The defendants argued, inter alia, that an independent hearing outcome (and the Collins presumption) defeats causation, and that Schnirman and Kemins enjoy absolute or qualified immunity; the court denied the motion to dismiss.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether McNamara plausibly alleged First Amendment retaliation (protected activity, causation, chilling) | McNamara alleges protected union speech and related conduct; disciplinary actions and termination were retaliatory | Defendants contend McNamara fails to plead causal link and that independent hearing undercuts causation | Court held complaint plausibly alleges retaliation; declined to apply Collins presumption at motion to dismiss stage |
| Whether Collins presumption (attenuation by independent tribunal) defeats causal link at pleading stage | Collins should not bar McNamara because facts plausibly show retaliation and causation | Defendants invoke Collins to argue the hearing decision severs causation | Court rejected applying Collins on motion to dismiss; Collins is a summary-judgment context tool and not controlling here |
| Whether Schnirman is entitled to absolute immunity for acting as hearing officer | McNamara argues Schnirman’s alleged retaliatory conduct is not entitled to absolute immunity | Defendants claim quasi-judicial role warrants absolute immunity | Court found defendants cited no authority extending absolute immunity to Schnirman in this context and denied dismissal on that ground |
| Whether Schnirman and Kemins are entitled to qualified immunity | McNamara alleges factual disputes showing retaliatory intent that would violate clearly established rights | Defendants argue it was objectively reasonable to pursue disciplinary actions and preside over hearing, so qualified immunity applies | Court held factual disputes preclude deciding qualified immunity at pleading stage and denied dismissal |
Key Cases Cited
- Faber v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 648 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2011) (pleading-stage standard; draw all reasonable inferences for plaintiff)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading must contain factual allegations supporting legal conclusions)
- Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility standard for pleadings)
- Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2009) (application of Iqbal/Twombly in Second Circuit)
- Curley v. Village of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2001) (elements of First Amendment retaliation claim)
- Collins v. New York City Transit Authority, 305 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2002) (independent tribunal may attenuate causation at summary-judgment stage)
- Austern v. Chicago Board of Options Exchange, Inc., 898 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1990) (absolute immunity historically applied to judges and some quasi-judicial actors)
- Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2010) (qualified immunity doctrine standards)
- In re Elevator Antitrust Litigation, 502 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 2007) (pleading standards and plausibility inquiry)
