McMullin v. McMullin
338 S.W.3d 315
Ky. Ct. App.2011Background
- Lewis McMullin and Phyllis McMullin married in 1971, separated in 1999, and dissolved in 2000 with no minor children.
- Lewis worked for UPS and participated in a retirement plan with a pension and a 401(k); the pension is based on years of service and age.
- Phyllis drafted a handwritten settlement agreeing to share the pension at the 20-year service rate and to share 401(k) funds, but the agreement left unresolved specifics about payout timing.
- A formal settlement agreement, incorporating substantial additional language, was drafted by Lewis’s attorney; Phyllis signed without counsel and later relied on oral representations.
- The decree incorporated the formal agreement, stating Phyllis would receive one-half of Lewis’s pension at the 20-year rate payable when the pension became payable and one-half of the 401(k) benefits, with taxes and expenses borne by her.
- Lewis retired in 2008 at age 55; in 2009 he sought QDROs for both plans; Phyllis objected to the pension division as drafted by Lewis’s counsel, arguing division should occur at retirement date.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the pension provision is ambiguous. | McMullin contends the date for calculating the pension is clear or should be date of divorce. | McMullin argues the provision is unambiguous or should be read in favor of his intent. | Ambiguity exists; term missing age/date for calculation. |
| Whether extrinsic evidence may fix the ambiguity. | Phyllis lacked knowledge and relied on oral assurances; extrinsic evidence should be permitted. | Phyllis had merger clause and contract terms limit reliance; extrinsic evidence limited. | Extrinsic evidence permissible; tribunal may determine intent. |
| Whether lack of Phyllis's counsel affects interpretation. | Phyllis signed without counsel; consequence of ambiguity should favor her. | Counsel's absence does not justify a rule against enforcing contract terms amid ambiguity. | Counsel absence not dispositive; ambiguity governs. |
| Whether contra proferentem and implied covenant apply to interpretation. | Phyllis should benefit from the ambiguity due to drafting by Lewis’s attorney. | Contra proferentem and implied covenant should not distort contract terms or allow misuse. | Contra proferentem and implied covenant applied; interpretation against the drafter. |
Key Cases Cited
- Foster v. Foster, 589 S.W.2d 223 (Ky.App. 1979) (pensions valued as of decree date; division permitted by contract)
- Money v. Money, 297 S.W.3d 69 (Ky.App. 2009) (contracts governing property division interpreted as contracts; not unconscionable)
- Frear v. P.T.A. Industries, Inc., 103 S.W.3d 99 (Ky. 2003) (use extrinsic evidence to determine contract intent when ambiguity exists)
- Whitlow v. Whitlow, 267 S.W.2d 739 (Ky. 1954) (consider contract context to ascertain parties' intent)
- Suter v. Mazyck, 226 S.W.3d 837 (Ky.App. 2007) (unclean-hands/public policy considerations in contract interpretation)
- Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205, Official Comment, Restatement (Second) Contracts (n/a) (implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; formation vs performance context)
- Money v. Money, 297 S.W.3d 69 (Ky.App. 2009) (contract interpretation governs disposition of property; de novo review)
- Foster v. Foster, 589 S.W.2d 223 (Ky.App. 1979) (pensions valued as of decree date; private contract terms may diverge from statutory scheme)
- Citations cited in opinion for context (agency scope etc.), See opinion text (n/a) (supporting principles on contract interpretation and public policy)