McMullen v. State
316 Ga. App. 684
| Ga. Ct. App. | 2012Background
- Tammi McMullen was convicted by a jury on two counts of homicide by vehicle in the first degree for a crash while allegedly under the influence of multiple drugs.
- The State introduced expert testimony that the combined drug levels would impair driving and a witness testified McMullen did not brake before striking a stationary truck and trailer, killing two people.
- McMullen consented to a blood draw at the hospital; the results later showed methamphetamine, morphine, and phentermine in her blood.
- The State introduced similar-transaction evidence of a 1997 methamphetamine possession with intent to distribute conviction to show her bent of mind and course of conduct.
- McMullen admitted possible drug sources but denied methamphetamine use; she offered other witnesses and a defense expert challenging testing methods.
- The trial court admitted the prior conviction over objection; after trial, the court denied a new-trial motion and this appeal followed, with the court ultimately reversing the convictions and allowing retrial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was the evidence sufficient for homicide by vehicle? | McMullen argues the evidence fails to prove impairment or causation. | McMullen contends the contradictions show the State failed to prove the necessary elements. | Yes; evidence supported impairment and causation under the statute. |
| Was the prior meth conviction admissible as similar-transaction evidence? | State says prior act showed course of conduct, intent, bent of mind. | Prior offense is dissimilar and remote; prejudicial and not probative of issue. | No; admission was clearly erroneous and reversed. |
| Did the absence of implied-consent warnings bar the blood evidence? | State relied on voluntary consent as statutory amendment allowed admission without warnings. | Failure to give implied-consent notices violated statute. | No; implied-consent amendment permits voluntary consent without warnings. |
| Was the blood-test testimony admissible under Confrontation and as to surrogate testimony? | The expert's testimony based on data and reports is admissible even without performing the tests. | Testimony via surrogate from a non-testifying analyst violates Confrontation. | Yes; the testimony was permissible because the expert reviewed data and had independent analysis, not mere surrogate testimony. |
Key Cases Cited
- Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640 (Ga. 1991) (prior acts admissible for specific purposes; danger of character evidence)
- Reed v. State, 291 Ga. 10 (Ga. 2012) (application of standard for reviewing admissibility of other-acts evidence)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (U.S. 2004) (Confrontation Clause rights and testimonial hearsay)
- Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (U.S. 2011) (surrogate testimony and drug-test result admissibility under confrontation)
- Jones v. State, nil (nil) (not included)
