McMullen v. McHughes Law Firm
2015 Ark. 15
| Ark. | 2015Background
- Precision Analytics assigned a decades-old credit-card debt originally in Owen McMullen’s name to McHughes Law Firm, which sued Lillie McMullen on November 16, 2012 to collect the debt.
- Lillie McMullen denied owing or using the card, defended against Precision’s suit, and that suit was dismissed by the trial court on August 28, 2013.
- After dismissal, McMullen sued McHughes in state court alleging violations of the FDCPA and AFDCPA, and state-law claims for invasion of privacy and malicious prosecution; she sought statutory damages, emotional damages, and attorney’s fees.
- McHughes moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), attaching documents (account records, complaint, affidavit) asserting probable cause to sue; the circuit court dismissed McMullen’s second amended complaint and denied reconsideration.
- On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed whether McMullen pleaded sufficient facts to state FDCPA/AFDCPA claims or viable state tort claims, emphasizing Rule 8’s requirement that complaints allege facts, not conclusions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether FDCPA/AFDCPA claims based on filing a suit and related statements were adequately pleaded | McMullen: filing the suit and asserting the debt after inadequate investigation and for improper amount violated FDCPA/AFDCPA (false representations; unfair practices) | McHughes: as a debt-collection law firm it may litigate claims; McMullen failed to plead facts showing false statements, improper amount, or that FDCPA duties were breached | Held: Dismissed — complaint contains conclusory allegations without factual detail; plaintiff failed to plead facts showing FDCPA violations |
| Whether dismissal of the underlying debt suit establishes falsity/probable cause absence | McMullen: dismissal proves statements were false and no probable cause existed | McHughes: affidavit and records provided facts supporting probable cause; dismissal does not automatically prove FDCPA/state-law violations | Held: Dismissed — dismissal alone does not establish statutory violation or satisfy pleading requirements; plaintiff failed to plead background facts showing lack of probable cause |
| Whether state-law invasion-of-privacy claims (intrusion/public disclosure) were pleaded sufficiently | McMullen: public disclosure and intrusion occurred when McHughes publicized and sued on a baseless debt | McHughes: plaintiff alleges the facts were false rather than private facts; no specific offensive disclosures pleaded; attorneys immune absent fraud/intentional misrepresentation | Held: Dismissed — plaintiff did not allege highly offensive intrusion or specific public disclosures; cannot plead public-disclosure claim by alleging disclosed facts were false |
| Whether malicious-prosecution claim was pleaded sufficiently | McMullen: McHughes continued suit despite knowing lack of merit, showing malice and lack of probable cause | McHughes: had probable cause based on client affidavit and account records; plaintiff failed to plead facts showing malice or the basis for lack of probable cause | Held: Dismissed — plaintiff failed to plead facts on probable cause, malice, or supporting background; mere dismissal is insufficient to state claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 559 U.S. 573 (2010) (FDCPA’s purpose to eliminate abusive debt collection practices)
- Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291 (1995) (attorneys who regularly collect consumer debt are debt collectors under the FDCPA)
- Born v. Hosto & Buchan, PLLC, 372 S.W.3d 324 (Ark. 2010) (limits on attorney liability for litigation activity; analysis of attorney immunity statute)
- Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Morrowland Valley Co., LLC, 411 S.W.3d 184 (Ark. 2012) (summary-judgment standard and appellate review framing)
- Biedenharn v. Thicksten, 206 S.W.3d 837 (Ark. 2005) (Rule 12(b)(6) review treating complaint facts as true)
- Dodrill v. Arkansas Democrat Co., 590 S.W.2d 840 (Ark. 1979) (adoption of Restatement approach to invasion-of-privacy torts)
