McMillan v. Live Nation Entertainment, Inc., 401 S.W.3d 473

Certified question from the U.S. District Court seeks whether Ark. Code Ann. § 5-63-201 applies to an exclusive ticket agent that sells music tickets with additional fees, making the price exceed face value.
McMillan sued Ticketmaster (exclusive agent for Verizon Arena) alleging fees (facility, convenience, processing) pushed total price above printed price, violating § 5-63-201(a)(1)(B) and ADTPA, plus unjust enrichment.
Ticketmaster moved to dismiss arguing first-party sale means § 5-63-201 does not apply; plaintiff argued fees violate the statute as applied to the agent’s charges.
The majority limits its review to the certified question, not whether fees violate § 5-63-201 or the ADTPA, and treats the statute as plain and unambiguous.
The court holds § 5-63-201 applies to exclusive agents, because the statute bans selling tickets at greater price than printed on the ticket or box office price plus reasonable charges, and it does not exclude exclusive agents.
Dissent argues the statute is ambiguous, contends first-party sellers should not be criminally liable for such fees, and urges narrow application to scalping; it would answer the question in the negative.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does § 5-63-201 apply to exclusive agents selling tickets with added fees?	McMillan: statute applies to any seller exceeding printed/box price.	Ticketmaster: box office price is what Verizon Arena charges; exclusive agent sales should not trigger criminal liability.	Yes; statute applies to exclusive ticket agents.

Central Ok. Pipeline, Inc. v. Hawk Field Servs., LLC, 2012 Ark. 157 (Ark. 2012) (statutory interpretation where plain language controls)
Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Richard’s Honda Yamaha, 344 Ark. 44 (Ark. 2001) (plain meaning governs when language is unambiguous)
City of Little Rock v. Ark. Corp. Comm’n, 209 Ark. 18 (Ark. 1945) (plain meaning when language unambiguous)
Scoggins v. Medlock, 2011 Ark. 194 (Ark. 2011) (title/legislative history used when meaning in doubt)
Oldham v. Morgan, 372 Ark. 159 (Ark. 2008) (remedial/statutory interpretation; legislative intent matters)
McCourt Mfg. Corp. v. Rycroft, 2009 Ark. 332 (Ark. 2009) (plain meaning governs when language is clear; avoid interpretation otherwise)
Heikkila v. State, 352 Ark. 87 (Ark. 2003) (strict construction of criminal statutes)
Baker Refrigeration Sys., Inc. v. Weiss, 360 Ark. 388 (Ark. 2005) (consideration of legislative intent in construction)
Williams v. State, 347 Ark. 728 (Ark. 2002) (strict construction principle for criminal statutes)
Meyer v. Rousseau, 47 Ark. 460 (Ark. 1886) (definition of 'sale' as transfer of property for price)
Roberson v. State, 2010 Ark. 433 (Ark. 2010) (use of legislative intent when statute ambiguous)
Dachs v. Hendrix, 2009 Ark. 542 (Ark. 2009) (statutory interpretation basics)