McMillan v. City of New York
711 F.3d 120
| 2d Cir. | 2013Background
- McMillan has schizophrenia treated with medication; he worked 10 years as a City HRA case manager and since 1997 as CASA case manager; CASA’s flex-time allowed arrival between 9:00–10:00 a.m. and late arrivals after 10:15 a.m. could be approved with banked time or unpaid leave; McMillan’s tardiness was due to medication, not malingering; from 2008 his lateness approvals stopped; he sought accommodations (later start 10:00–11:00 a.m.) and to bank time by working through lunch or staying late; district court granted summary judgment for City finding arrival time essential and not accommodating; on appeal, the court vacated and remanded for a fact-specific analysis.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is arriving by 10:15 a.m. an essential function of McMillan’s job? | McMillan argues time of arrival is not essential if he can complete duties. | City contends fixed arrival time is essential to perform job. | Not decided; court vacated and remanded for fact-specific inquiry. |
| Was McMillan “otherwise qualified” to perform essential functions with or without accommodation given tardiness from disability? | McMillan can perform duties if accommodated (banked time/lunch work). | Tardiness precludes qualification without undue hardship. | Not resolved; remand required to assess with accommodation. |
| Were McMillan’s requested accommodations reasonable (e.g., later start, lunch banking)? | Accommodations could allow him to complete essential functions. | Accommodations may be unreasonable or unduly burdensome. | Remanded to evaluate reasonableness of accommodations. |
| Did the City’s asserted legitimate business reason (tardiness) prevail or was it pretextual? | Discipline for tardiness tied to disability; pretext not necessary to show with accommodations. | Tardiness independently justified discipline. | Not dispositive on appeal; pretext not the central issue here; remand for factual development. |
Key Cases Cited
- McElwee v. County of Orange, 700 F.3d 635 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary judgment de novo standard; ADA claims context.)
- McBride v. BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2009) (prima facie ADA burden includes reasonable accommodation requirement.)
- Sista v. CDC Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2006) (elements of disability discrimination prima facie case.)
- Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 951 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1991) (when employer’s action relates to disability, pretext analysis may be unnecessary.)
- Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1995) (discretion in reasonable accommodation analysis; burden on employer.)
- Shannon v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 332 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2003) (reasonable accommodations and essential functions guidance.)