McLeod v. State
297 Ga. 99
Ga.2015Background
- On August 25–26, 2009 Jennifer McLeod, Amin Dennis, and Corey Dennis planned and executed a robbery of Harold Reese; McLeod lured Reese to her home by phone and acted as the decoy.
- Amin and Corey bound Reese with zip ties, took cash, marijuana, electronics and keys; they found Jerry Lawrence unconscious in Reese’s vehicle.
- The trio drove Reese (and Lawrence) to a nearby cotton field; Amin shot and killed Lawrence and Reese. The perpetrators burned Reese’s vehicle and disposed of evidence; McLeod admitted to luring Reese and burning clothes with the others.
- McLeod was indicted on two counts of malice murder, felony murder (aggravated assault), kidnapping with bodily injury, aggravated assault, and first‑degree arson; a jury convicted on all counts and the trial court sentenced her to concurrent life terms for the murders plus additional prison terms.
- On appeal McLeod challenged (1) sufficiency of evidence as to murders/related offenses, (2) a defective arson indictment, and (3) ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to move to suppress vehicle evidence and for failing to object to hearsay/prior‑consistent statement testimony.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (McLeod) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for crimes against Lawrence (murder, aggravated assault, kidnapping) | McLeod lacked knowledge Lawrence was in car or being threatened/killed; thus she was not a party to those crimes | McLeod conspired to rob Reese; co‑conspirators’ violent acts were foreseeable and she participated before/during/after (planning, driving, destroying evidence) | Affirmed — sufficient evidence to convict McLeod as a party under conspiracy/party liability doctrines |
| Sufficiency of evidence for crimes against Reese (murder, assault, kidnapping) | She only intended robbery, not kidnapping/assault/murder; no proof she joined a plan to kill or kidnap Reese | Participation in an armed robbery conspiracy made the violent deaths a foreseeable consequence; shared intent may be inferred from conduct | Affirmed — sufficient evidence to convict under conspiracy/party principles |
| First‑degree arson (burning of Reese’s vehicle) — indictment sufficiency | Indictment failed to allege any statutory subsection method (a)(2)-(5); trial proof did not establish any listed method | State conceded indictment defective | Reversed and sentence vacated — conviction unsupported by proof of statutory method; conviction vacated |
| Ineffective assistance — (a) failure to move to suppress vehicle search; (b) failure to object to agent testimony repeating witness’s prior consistent statement | (a) Warrant affidavit didn’t identify McLeod’s vehicle; suppression likely; (b) agent’s testimony improperly bolstered Ms. Dennis and attacked McLeod’s credibility | (a) vehicle was within curtilage and searchable incident to dwelling warrant; suppression motion would not have succeeded; (b) even if inadmissible, overwhelming evidence of guilt means no prejudice from failure to object | Denied — no ineffective assistance shown: no reasonable probability suppression would have been granted and no showing that exclusion of the testimony would have changed outcome |
Key Cases Cited
- Huffman v. State, 257 Ga. 390 (conspiracy liability: co‑conspirators liable for acts in execution of conspiracy)
- Everritt v. State, 277 Ga. 457 (foreseeability limits on conspirator liability)
- Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (co‑conspirator liability for acts in furtherance and foreseeable consequences)
- Parks v. State, 272 Ga. 353 (dangerousness of intended crimes may render death foreseeable)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for sufficiency of evidence)
- Thomas v. State, 296 Ga. 485 (shared criminal intent may be inferred from conduct)
- Redding v. State, 296 Ga. 471 (review practice for sufficiency of evidence in murder cases)
- Richardson v. State, 276 Ga. 548 (standard for showing prejudice from failure to litigate suppression)
- Baugh v. State, 276 Ga. 736 (erroneous admission of prior consistent statement reversible if it likely contributed to guilty verdict)