McLellan v. Brown, 103,799-6

Washington law temporarily prohibits firearm possession by anyone convicted twice within seven years of DUI, with restoration available after five law-abiding years. 1
McLellan was convicted of DUI three times within seven years and Holloway twice within seven years, and both were denied concealed-carry permits under the statute. 2
They sued for declaratory relief, claiming the statute was unconstitutional as applied to them under the Second Amendment. 3
The trial court allowed factual development on whether their firearm possession posed a credible threat to public safety, and the State obtained direct interlocutory review. 4
The legislature enacted the law in 2023 after considering evidence linking frequent risky alcohol use to future violence. 5
The Washington Supreme Court held the statute constitutional as applied and reversed for judgment on the pleadings for the State. 6

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does the DUI-based temporary firearm ban violate the Second Amendment as applied? 7	McLellan and Holloway said recidivist DUI is nonviolent and no individualized dangerousness finding supports disarmament.	Brown argued the law fits historical traditions disarming dangerous, serious-crime, and intoxication-related offenders.	No; the statute is constitutional as applied. 8
Must the State show an individualized threat of violence? 9	They claimed Rahimi requires a court finding of credible threat before temporary disarmament.	Brown said postconviction disarmament can rest on categorical legislative judgments.	No individualized assessment was required here. 10
Are historical analogues sufficient for DUI recidivist disarmament? 11	They argued the State lacked a close historical analogue for disarming nonviolent DUI offenders.	Brown relied on traditions disarming dangerous groups, serious criminals, and alcohol-abusing persons.	Yes; the analogues were sufficiently similar. 12

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (U.S. 2008) (Second Amendment right is not unlimited; longstanding bans on felons and the mentally ill are presumptively lawful 13)
N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (U.S. 2022) (Second Amendment regulations must be consistent with historical tradition; analogical reasoning governs 14)
United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (U.S. 2024) (temporary disarmament is allowed for persons found to pose a credible threat of physical violence 15)
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (U.S. 2010) (individual self-defense is central to the Second Amendment and the right is fundamental 16)
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (U.S. 1939) (cited for the historical tradition limiting protected arms to those in common use 17)
Medina v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 152 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (historical penalties on felons may inform whether firearm restrictions are historically grounded 18)
United States v. Jackson, 110 F.4th 1120 (8th Cir. 2024) (repeated convictions can support disarmament where they show dangerous, nonlaw-abiding conduct 19)
United States v. Duarte, 137 F.4th 743 (9th Cir. 2025) (recognized historical tradition of disarming dangerous groups and rejected a need for individualized dangerousness in some categorical bans 20)
Range v. Attorney General U.S., 124 F.4th 218 (3d Cir. 2024) (discussed whether nonviolent fraud was closely associated with physical danger for firearm-disability purposes 21)