449 P.3d 492
Or.2019Background
- McLaughlin worked as a medical assistant at Hope Orthopedics and was supervised and trained by Dr. Wilson; he initially gave a positive reference when she applied to Willamette University’s MBA program.
- Wilson began sexually harassing McLaughlin; she reported his conduct to Hope and was placed on paid leave, then left for the MBA program after the complaint was resolved.
- Five days after resolution, Wilson went to Willamette’s admissions office and falsely told the admissions director that McLaughlin had left previous jobs after obtaining large settlements and gag orders, causing reputational harm and emotional distress.
- McLaughlin sued for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and retaliation under ORS 659A.030(1)(f); the trial court dismissed the retaliation claim, reasoning § 659A.030(1)(f) did not reach a non‑employer individual.
- The Court of Appeals reversed; the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding (1) “person” in § 659A.030(1)(f) includes individuals, and (2) “otherwise discriminate against” is not limited to acts occurring only within an employment relationship; the case was remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether “person” in ORS 659A.030(1)(f) includes non‑employer individuals | “Person” should be read as defined in ORS 659A.001 to include individuals, so Wilson is covered | The historic text referenced employers; the 2001 change to “person” was not intended to expand coverage to non‑employers | Held: “Person” includes individuals like Wilson; the statutory definition controls and context supports a broad reading |
| Whether “otherwise discriminate against” is limited to employment‑related acts or terms/conditions of employment | The phrase reaches retaliatory acts with a nexus to employment and can include acts outside the workplace that reasonably deter enforcement of rights | It should be read ejusdem generis with “discharge” and “expel,” limiting it to employment/union membership contexts | Held: Not strictly limited to in‑workplace acts or terms/conditions; ejusdem generis does not confine the phrase to only employment relationships |
| Whether Wilson’s statements to the MBA admissions director fall within § 659A.030(1)(f) | Wilson’s false, reputation‑damaging statements were made as McLaughlin’s former supervisor, related to her past work and future employment prospects, and could deter others from reporting | Wilson argued the conduct occurred outside the workplace and so is not within § 659A.030(1)(f) | Held: Allegations show a clear nexus to prior employment and potential future employment; the conduct falls within “otherwise discriminate against,” so dismissal was erroneous |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Gaines, 346 Or. 160 (discusses statutory interpretation methodology)
- PGE v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 317 Or. 606 (same-term usage and statutory context principles)
- PSU Ass’n of Univ. Professors v. PSU, 352 Or. 697 (interpreting § 659A.030(1)(f) and adopting a standard akin to Burlington)
- Burlington N. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (Title VII retaliation scope; useful comparative context)
- Comcast Corp. v. Dept. of Rev., 356 Or. 282 (use of defined statutory terms)
- Bailey v. Lewis Farm, Inc., 343 Or. 276 (standard on motion to dismiss—accept complaint allegations and inferences)
- Monaco v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar., 275 Or. 183 (courts should not rewrite clear statutory text)