476 P.3d 1032
Wash.2020Background
- Todd McLaughlin, riding a bicycle in Seattle, was struck by a car door and incurred substantial medical expenses.
- He held a California-issued auto policy with $5,000 MedPay; the policy covered "You... as a pedestrian when struck by a motor vehicle," but did not define "pedestrian."
- Travelers denied MedPay coverage, contending "pedestrian" excludes bicyclists and citing vehicle-code definitions.
- Trial court granted Travelers summary judgment; Court of Appeals affirmed (relying on harmonizing vehicle-code definitions); Supreme Court granted review.
- The Washington Supreme Court held RCW 48.22.005(11) (the casualty-insurance definition of "pedestrian") applies and includes bicyclists, reversed the Court of Appeals, remanded for further proceedings, and awarded attorney fees to McLaughlin.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the policy term "pedestrian" includes bicyclists for MedPay coverage | McLaughlin: RCW 48.22.005(11) (casualty-insurance context) defines "pedestrian" broadly to include non-motorized persons; average purchaser expects coverage when struck by a car | Travelers: "Pedestrian" in ordinary/dictionary or vehicle-code usage excludes bicyclists; policy written in California should use its plain meaning | Court: Yes. Applied RCW 48.22.005(11); bicyclist not occupying a motor vehicle is a "pedestrian." Alternatively, term is ambiguous and construed for insured. |
| Whether Washington's casualty-insurance definitional statute applies to a California-issued MedPay policy | McLaughlin: Washington law governs contract interpretation in suits filed here; regulatory statutes are read into insurance policies | Travelers (and dissent): Contract was formed in California; parties did not contemplate Washington PIP statutes; ordinary meaning and parties' intent should control | Court (majority): Read RCW 48.22.005 into the policy; concurrence agreed coverage result but not statutory import; dissent would apply ordinary meaning to the California contract. |
| Entitlement to attorney fees for compelled litigation | McLaughlin: Seeks fees under Olympic S.S. Co. and RAP 18.1 because insurer forced suit to obtain benefits | Travelers: Opposed | Court: McLaughlin entitled to fees; remanded to trial court to determine amount. |
Key Cases Cited
- Touchette v. Nw. Mut. Ins. Co., 80 Wn.2d 327 (1972) (regulatory statutes become part of insurance policies)
- Durant v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 191 Wn.2d 1 (2018) (Washington public policy favors full compensation of road-accident medical benefits)
- Sprague v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 174 Wn.2d 524 (2012) (insurance terms construed according to typical purchaser's understanding)
- Holden v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 169 Wn.2d 750 (2010) (term ambiguous if susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation)
- Jack v. Standard Marine Ins. Co., 33 Wn.2d 265 (1949) (ambiguities in insurance contracts resolved in insured's favor)
- Boeing Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 113 Wn.2d 869 (1990) (undefined contract terms receive their plain, ordinary, popular meaning)