McLAUGHLIN v. PAYNE
295 Ga. 609
Ga.2014Background
- Payne was convicted in 2006 of multiple child-molestation and cruelty-to-children counts; convictions were affirmed on direct appeal.
- At trial Douglas Judicial Circuit District Attorney David McDade testified for the State, describing his role as DA, involvement early in the investigation, and a personal connection via his daughter’s relationship to the victim.
- Payne moved pretrial to disqualify the DA’s office under Rule 3.7 and related authority because McDade would be a witness; the trial court denied disqualification of the entire office.
- Payne later filed a habeas petition asserting, among other things, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise McDade’s disqualification and related issues on direct appeal.
- The habeas court found McDade had a personal conflict of interest that disqualified him (and thus the office absent proper substitution under OCGA §15-18-5), that screening was ineffective, and that appellate counsel should have raised the issue; it granted habeas relief.
- The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the habeas court’s judgment, concluding McDade’s personal conflict removed the DA’s office authority and no statutory replacement was appointed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising DA-office disqualification on direct appeal | Payne: appellate counsel should have argued McDade’s conflict disqualified the entire DA’s office and required substitution; raising it would have changed the appeal’s outcome | Warden: Rule 3.7 disqualification of a prosecutor as a witness does not automatically impute to the entire office; prevailing law made such an appeal meritless | Held: Habeas court’s finding of ineffective assistance affirmed because McDade had a personal interest that disqualified the office and no statutory substitution occurred |
| Whether McDade’s role as a trial witness required disqualification of the entire DA’s office | Payne: McDade’s personal involvement and relationship to witnesses created a disqualifying conflict extending to the office | Warden: Precedent (e.g., Brown) permits the office to continue with screening; disqualification of one prosecutor doesn’t automatically bar the office | Held: Where the elected DA had a personal interest disqualifying him from the prosecution, his authority could not be exercised by assistants absent appointment under OCGA §15-18-5; Brown was distinguishable |
| Whether screening and cessation of McDade’s participation were adequate | Payne: screening was ineffective; McDade remained involved (e.g., witness interviews in 2005–06) | Warden: DA ceased prosecution early and office counsel conducted trial; no prejudice shown | Held: Factfinding supported that screening failed and McDade remained connected, supporting disqualification |
| Whether a different appellate result was reasonably probable if the conflict issue had been raised | Payne: raising the conflict would have led to reversal or new trial | Warden: appellate counsel’s omission was reasonable given precedent; no Strickland prejudice shown | Held: Court agreed with habeas court that prejudice existed — the omitted claim likely would have changed the appeal’s outcome |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Barker v. Barrow, 290 Ga. 711 (standard of review for habeas ineffective-assistance findings)
- Brown v. State, 261 Ga. 66 (discussing disqualification of a single prosecutor vs. entire office)
- Jackson v. State, 156 Ga. 842 (DA’s supervisory control over prosecutions)
- Lane v. State, 238 Ga. 407 (prosecutorial conflict can warrant new trial)
- Williams v. State, 258 Ga. 305 (personal interest by prosecutor can disqualify)