200 F. Supp. 3d 591
D. Md.2016Background
- Plaintiff Judith McLaughlin (b. 1963) filed for Disability Insurance Benefits alleging fibromyalgia, migraines, major depressive disorder, anxiety, panic disorder, and left ankle tenosynovitis, with an alleged onset of July 22, 2011.
- State agency reviewers assessed moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace and physical RFC consistent with light work (lifting 20 lbs occ., stand/sit ~6 hrs/day); consultative exams generally showed intact cognition and fair memory/attention on exams.
- At hearing Plaintiff testified to widespread pain, fatigue, ‘‘brain fog,’’ panic attacks, and functional limitations but also reported a range of daily activities (driving short trips, shopping, preparing simple meals, managing finances, caring for a pet).
- The ALJ found Plaintiff has severe impairments, moderate limitation in concentration/persistence/pace at step three, but assigned an RFC for light work limited to simple, routine tasks plus "new or more complex tasks not occurring more frequently than once every two weeks" and "a few extra minutes of supervision at times of task change." The ALJ concluded Plaintiff could perform certain unskilled light jobs and was not disabled.
- The Appeals Council denied review; Plaintiff sued in district court seeking remand, arguing the RFC and hypothetical did not account for her moderate limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace per Mascio.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ALJ properly translated step‑three finding of moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace into the RFC/hypothetical | McLaughlin: ALJ erred by relying on "simple, routine tasks" without a corresponding on‑task/productivity limitation and by failing to perform a function‑by‑function RFC per SSR 96‑8p and Mascio | Commissioner: RFC language (simple routine tasks + occasional extra supervision at task change) adequately accounted for moderate limitations; VE testimony supported jobs | Remand required: ALJ failed to explain how moderate limitations would allow productivity ≥85% of workday (VE said >15% off‑task precludes work); decision frustrated meaningful review under Mascio |
| Whether ALJ needed explicit function‑by‑function RFC analysis per SSR 96‑8p | McLaughlin: ALJ did not perform required function‑by‑function assessment or explain certain RFC phrases ("new or more complex tasks not occurring more frequently than once every two weeks" and "few extra minutes of supervision") | Commissioner: Not disputed that ALJ used evidence to reach RFC; some limitations were addressed by RFC narrative | Court: ALJ’s shortcomings (especially re: concentration/pace and productivity) frustrated review; remand appropriate without resolving every alleged omission |
| Whether ALJ improperly omitted left ankle tenosynovitis from RFC | McLaughlin: Severe impairment was not reflected in RFC | Commissioner: Physical RFC was based on state agency opinions and exams | Court: Did not resolve this claim because remand was required on primary concentration/pace issue |
| Whether ALJ’s step‑three moderate finding could stand without an RFC limitation for on‑task ability | McLaughlin: Step‑three moderate finding must translate into RFC limitation | Commissioner: Step‑three finding can coexist with RFC for simple tasks if supported | Court: Must either include corresponding RFC limitation or explain why not; ALJ did not do so here — remand ordered |
Key Cases Cited
- Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103 (holding that ALJ decisions become final when Appeals Council denies review)
- Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20 (describing the five‑step disability evaluation process)
- Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632 (requiring an ALJ to either include limitations for moderate difficulties in concentration/persistence/pace in the RFC or explain why not)
- Radford v. Colvin, 734 F.3d 288 (discussing burden of proof and RFC assessment role)
- Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176 (remanding where ALJ failed to build the logical bridge from evidence to RFC and did not do function‑by‑function assessment)
- Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470 (explaining the Commissioner’s burden at step five)