91 Cal.App.5th 1232
Cal. Ct. App.2023Background
- Danija McKneely was found incompetent to stand trial and committed to the Department of State Hospitals (DSH); after ~13 months DSH issued a certificate of restoration supported by a 16‑page forensic psychologist report.
- Upon return to the committing court, McKneely’s counsel filed a detailed declaration asserting McKneely remained incompetent and asked the court to reject the certificate.
- In 2022 the Legislature added Penal Code §1372(c)(2), requiring that rejection of a DSH restoration certificate be based on a written evaluation by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist performed after the certificate is filed and in compliance with §1369.
- The trial court concluded it could not reject the certificate based solely on counsel’s declaration and was prepared to appoint an expert; McKneely sought a writ to declare §1372(c)(2) unconstitutional.
- McKneely argued the statute violated separation of powers (by dictating required proof to courts), due process (risking trial while incompetent and prolonging commitment), and public policy; the Court of Appeal denied the petition.
Issues
| Issue | McKneely's Argument | People/Respondent's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Separation of powers: may Legislature prescribe the form of proof required to reject a DSH restoration certificate? | The statute usurps judicial core function by forcing courts to accept certificates unless a competing expert report exists, preventing courts from independently weighing evidence. | Legislature may set procedural rules and a rebuttable presumption; requiring an expert report to rebut a DSH certificate does not eliminate the court’s fact‑finding or power to appoint experts. | Statute upheld: it creates a rebuttable presumption and does not materially impair the court’s adjudicative function. |
| Due process — risk of trying an incompetent defendant | Requiring an expert evaluation before rejecting a certificate creates an unacceptably high risk a defendant will be tried while incompetent. | The statute preserves a hearing, preserves right to challenge, and allows re‑declaring doubt under §1368; courts can order an evaluation on request. | Rejected: statute does not preclude hearings or later re‑declaration of doubt; due process safeguarded. |
| Due process — prolonging commitment by delay for appointed expert | Appointment and report production causes delay and extends involuntary commitment beyond what due process allows. | Defendant released upon serving statutory maximum; courts may relax appointment guidelines if no reasonably available expert. | Rejected: speculative; statutory maximum and appointment flexibilities mitigate the concern. |
| Public policy / resource concerns | The amendment incentivizes DSH to issue sham certificates to free beds and burdens limited expert resources and public funds. | Legislature balanced competing interests; courts should defer to legislative policy choices; §1369 allows appointment flexibility. | Rejected: policy disagreement does not render statute unconstitutional; courts must defer to Legislature absent a constitutional violation. |
Key Cases Cited
- Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (establishing competency standard: understanding proceedings and assisting counsel)
- In re R.V., 61 Cal.4th 181 (discussing court’s role evaluating expert competency evidence)
- Briggs v. Brown, 3 Cal.5th 808 (narrow separation‑of‑powers limit on procedural regulation by Legislature)
- People v. Quiroz, 244 Cal.App.4th 1371 (special proceedings are creatures of statute and courts’ jurisdiction limited by statute)
- People v. Mixon, 225 Cal.App.3d 1471 (section 1372 hearings are proceedings under §1369 and permit hearings where certificate is challenged)
- People v. Rodas, 6 Cal.5th 219 (re‑declaring doubt after competency finding requires substantial change or new evidence)
- Jackson v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.5th 96 (statutory maximum commitment protects due process rights)