McKitrick v. Gibson, 496 P.3d 147

In 2017 Kerry Gibson, then a Weber County Commissioner, was investigated for alleged misuse of public resources; Davis County declined to file charges.
Freelance journalist Cathy McKitrick filed a GRAMA request for the investigative records; Ogden City denied the request, classifying the records private/protected.
McKitrick appealed to Ogden City’s chief administrative officer (denial affirmed) and then to the Ogden City Records Review Board, which reversed and ordered release with limited redactions.
Ogden City did not appeal; Gibson (the subject of the records) petitioned the district court for judicial review although he was not the requester or a political subdivision under GRAMA.
McKitrick moved to dismiss for lack of statutory standing; the district court denied the motion. The Utah Supreme Court granted interlocutory review and reversed: Gibson lacks statutory standing under GRAMA and cannot proceed using traditional or alternative standing.

Issue	Gibson's Argument	McKitrick's Argument	Held
Whether Gibson has statutory standing under GRAMA to seek judicial review of a local appeals board decision	Gibson claimed his privacy interest as the subject of the records makes him an "interested party," and cited Ogden municipal code as permitting appeal	GRAMA §63G-2-701(6)(a) permits only a "requester" or a "political subdivision" to appeal; Gibson is neither	Only a requester or political subdivision may petition for judicial review of a local appeals board decision; Gibson lacks statutory standing
Whether the terms "political subdivision" and "requester" in §63G-2-701(6)(a) are non-exclusive	The statute’s language is not expressly exclusive; omission shouldn’t bar other appellants	Expressio unius: use of specific terms implies exclusion of others unless statute signals otherwise	The statute’s wording and context show the terms are exclusive; legislature used those terms advisedly
Whether traditional or public‑interest (alternative) standing can cure a lack of statutory standing for a statutory claimant	Even if GRAMA doesn’t expressly grant standing, Gibson can proceed because he meets traditional/alternative standing tests	A statutory claim requires statutory standing; constitutional standing cannot supply a remedy the statute withholds	A statutory claimant must have statutory standing; traditional or alternative standing cannot cure statutory standing deficiencies

Haik v. Jones, 427 P.3d 1155 (2018 UT 39) (concurrence posed but did not answer whether traditional standing can substitute for statutory standing)
In re Questar Gas Co., 175 P.3d 545 (2007 UT 79) (dismissed petition for lack of statutory standing despite parties meeting traditional‑standing criteria)
Cedar Mountain Env’t, Inc. v. Tooele Cnty., 214 P.3d 95 (2009 UT 48) (discussed alternative standing but any suggestion that it can cure lack of statutory standing was dicta)
Washington Cnty. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 82 P.3d 1125 (2003 UT 58) (explained relation between statutory and traditional standing where statutory right mirrored traditional test)
Utah Chapter of Sierra Club v. Air Quality Bd., 148 P.3d 960 (2006 UT 74) (articulated traditional‑standing requirements)
Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Bd. of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909 (Utah 1993) (discussed standing doctrines and their application to statutory rights)