994 F. Supp. 2d 259
D. Conn.2014Background
- McKinstry, age 61, worked as a CNA for Sheriden Woods in multiple periods from 1966 to 2010, most recently 1998–July 7, 2010 when terminated.
- At termination, McKinstry’s performance was above average and she had received merit increases; she was told she could have a job at the company as long as she wanted.
- In 2010 McKinstry received January notices for floor-room issues and later a January 31 notice for not assisting on a call; she was told there were 15 complaints, but not who made them.
- On June 15, 2010 she found medication in a patient’s room; she was suspended June 22 and terminated July 7, with younger workers replacing her.
- McKinstry claims termination was age-based and pretextual, and that assurances of long-term employment created an oral contract restricting termination absent good cause.
- The complaint asserts four counts: ADEA/CFEPA discrimination, breach of oral contract, promissory estoppel, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith; the defendant moved to dismiss all counts except the ADEA/CFEPA claim.
- The court applies Twombly/Iqbal standard, limits review to pleadings, attached exhibits, and judicially noticed materials, and notes CFEPA claims follow ADEA analysis
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether McKinstry adequately pleads ADEA/CFEPA discrimination | McKinstry alleges age-based termination with pretext given 61 at firing and replacement by younger workers. | McKinstry’s allegations do not specify ages of replacements or age-specific remarks. | First Count survives; discrimination plausibly inferred from age and pretext evidence. |
| Whether there was an express or implied contract with just-cause termination | Statements that she could have a job as long as she wanted imply protection from suspension/demotion without just cause. | Employment at-will default; no facts show express/implied just-cause provision. | Second Count dismissed; no just-cause term implied or expressed. |
| Whether promissory estoppel can be pled based on job-security promises | Promises of long-term employment induced reliance by continuing to work. | No clear or definite promise or reliance; no injury shown. | Third Count dismissed; failure to establish required elements. |
| Whether breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is viable | Termination was arbitrary and pretextual, violating implied covenant. | At-will employment; no public policy violation shown; CFEPA precludes breach-of-covenant claim for age-discrimination. | Fourth Count dismissed; precluded by at-will doctrine and CFEPA. |
Key Cases Cited
- Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (plausibility pleading requirement;)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (rejects bare legal conclusions; must plead plausible facts;)
- Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (U.S. 1974) (notice pleading standard; not bound to accept legal conclusions as fact;)
- Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (U.S. 1986) (cited for pleading standards in 12(b)(6) dismissals;)
- Samuels v. Air Transp. Local 504, 992 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1993) (evidence rules on what may be considered in 12(b)(6) review;)
- Gonzalez v. Carestream Health, Inc., 520 Fed.Appx. 8 (2d Cir. 2013) (ADR-age discrimination standards referenced;)
- Yale New Haven Hosp., 727 F.Supp.784 (D. Conn. 1990) (limits on conversion of facts in pleadings; judicial notice context.)